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This study concerns the impact of the New International Division of Labor on
investment and employment in the manufacturing sector of the Nigerian economy. The
study was historical in analysis, and the descriptive research design was employed.
Primary and secondary data served as the sources of information in this undertaking. The
internationalization of capital theory was developed as the underlying conceptual
framework of the study. A questionnaire was administered to multinational and indigenous
companies. A comparative analysis of the responses showed the respective companies'
effects on the Nigerian economy, and the reasons for the tendency toward the New
International Division of Labor (NIDL) in Nigeria. The hypotheses were measured by the
following factors:
1. Level of employment generation.
2. Activity type of manufacturing.
3. Amount of training and manpower development provided in the economy.
4. Utilization of labor quality in industrial ventures.
The following significant findings were observed:
1. Foreign industries do not encourage export manufacturing products to stimulate
much-needed hard currency.
2. The NDDL generates employment opportunities in the Nigerian economy.
3. Higher wage rates offer^ by foreign companies to the labor market in Nigeria have
no effect on availability of quality labor to the indigenous companies.
4. Nigerian workers are not given the training and skills needed to develop the self-
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Fundamental structural changes in the current world economic system are
transforming the ways in which goods are produced, distributed, exchanged, and
consumed in the world market, and attest to the rising influence of the New International
Division of Labor (NIDL). In this study, this is defined as those tendencies which:
(a) undermine the traditional bisection of the world into a few industrialized
countries on one hand, and a great majority of developing countries integrated
into the world economy solely as raw material producers on the other, and
(b) compel the increasing subdivision of manufacturing processes into a number
of partial operations at different industrial sites throughout the world. i
Folke, Fold, and Enevoldsen define it as a tendency spearheaded by the Newly
Industrialising Countries (NIC) in the past two decades that changed the traditional pattern
of some developing countries in the South which have exponed raw materials in the past to
the developed countries in the North in exchange for manufactured goods, but at present
have developed a very considerable export of manufactured goods (textiles, clothing,
electronics), primarily to the North.2
iFolker Frobel, Jurgen Heinrichs, and Otto Kreye, The New International Division
of Labour: Structural Unemployment in Industrialised Countries and Industrialisation in
Developing Countries (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), p. 45.
2Steen Folke, Niels Fold, and Thyge Enevoldsen, South-South Trade and
Development: Manufacturers in the New International Division of Labour (London:
Macmillan Press, 1993), p. 1.
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Further, Richard Higgott defined the NIDL as the emerging structure in the world
economy in the 1970s as a result of the economic boom of the 1950s and 1960s that
involved the relocation of entire industries from industrialized to developing countries.3
The researcher views the NIDL as a global market strategy of internationalizing labor and
capital by the advanced capitalist countries so as to make profits as well as advance their
interests and ideologies.
The world market-oriented industrialization, which is presently emerging in many
developing countries, is not the result of positive decisions made by individual
governments or companies. Investors locate industry at those sites where production will
yield a certain profit, sites which can sustain further development for the world economy.
In the "classical" international division of labor, industrial sites for manufacturing basically
only existed in western Europe and later in the USA and Japan. This division of labor is
defined as a few industrial countries producing capital goods and consumer goods, and
confronting the vast majority of underdeveloped countries which were integrated into the
world economy as producers of raw materials.^ A rationalized investment approach was
the anchor to the survival of companies in the past; that is, the installation of more efficient
machinery and a reduction in the size and skills of the labor force. This traditional device,
along with other classical devices, became obsolete.
There are a number of observable phenomena in the capitalist world economy
which strongly suggest that the present conditions for the valorization and accumulation of
capital passed through fundamental qualitative changes. These phenomena include the far-
reaching industrial relocation of manufacturing from the "center" toward and even within
3Richard Higgott, "Africa and the New International Division of Labor," in John
Ravenhill, ed., Africa in Economic Crisis (New York; Columbia University Press, 1986),
p. 286.
■^Frobel, et al.. The New International Division of Labour, op. cit., p. 40.
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the periphery, stagnating or declining investment rates, the rise of structural unemployment
in the industrial branches of the so-called center, and increasingly export-oriented
manufacturing in the periphery. This new set of conditions for the valorization and
accumulation of capital manifested itself strongly in the 1960s.5 Three pre-conditions,
taken together, seemed to be decisive for this development:
First, a practically inexhaustible reservoir of disposable labor has come into
existence in the developing countries over the years past. Also, these labor
forces are extremely cheap and tempting and can be mobilized for production.
Secondly, the division and subdivision of the production process is so
advanced that most of these fragmented operations can be carried out with
minimal levels of skill easily learned and adapted within a very short time by the
use of technology. Thirdly, the development of techniques of transport and
communication has created the possibility, in many cases, of the complete or
partial production of goods at any site in the world—a possibility no longer
ruled out by technical, organizational, and other cost factor considerations.^
The term designating this qualitatively new development in the world economy is
the New International Division of Labor (NIDL). Therefore, the current observable
relocation of production in industry (both within the traditional center and toward the
periphery), and the increasing worldwide subdivision of the production process, are the
result of a qualitative change in the conditions for valorization and accumulation of capital
which force the development of the NIDL. It was a consequence of these new conditions
that various countries and companies were forced to tailor their policies and profit-
maximizing strategies to these new conditions (i.e., the requirements of the world market
for industrial sites). These complex changes in the national productive relations and the
global restructuring underlying the NIDL, according to this researcher, should be correctly





The implications of this changing contact pattern—particularly its social, political,
and economic effects—have not yet been the subject of extensive research. An analysis of
the causes of this relationship and its implications for Nigeria must be carried out within the
framework of a general analysis of the elements of the process of restructuring the
international political economy.
Statement of the Problem
Capitalist internationalization is one of the most controversial phenomena of the
world economy. The capitalist view is that the capitalist market can be played to the
advantage of the poor, as demonstrated by the general rise in the standard of living in the
industrialized world and the rise of newly industrialized countries such as Singapore, South
Korea, and Taiwan. From this viewpoint, the developing countries hope that, by
bestowing on them the benefits of improved technology and managerial skills, creating
more employment, and generally serving as agents of change for their economic
development and opportunity, they will move ahead. To the opposing view, capitalist
penetration in the developing country is a threat to the economic sovereignty of the
developing nation, hindering its development of self-reliance and promoting greed and
materialism.
This industrialized capital is vital to the economic survival of Nigeria because it will
stimulate the badly shattered economy. As former President Babangida of Nigeria said, "It
is understandable that Nigeria should be wooing investors so hard and doing everything it
can to smooth the way for investment."'^ Further, the Industrial Development
Coordinating Committee (IDCC) of Nigeria approved a total of 427 business permits for
joint ventures involving foreign participation in 1992.8 These statements exemplify how
^"Nigeria Woos Investors," West Africa. February 17-23, 1992, p. 268.
5
Nigeria is being drawn into this global investment and characterize the economic and
political implications of this pursuit.
This study's point of departure is a reconsideration of the NIDL insofar as its
origins lie not in a social division of labor among states in the world market, but rather in a
technical division of labor within the organization of the capitalist system using the
transnational corporations (TNC) as the agents for the operation. Where the TNC is
increasingly the structuring agent of international productive capital and in particular of
export-manufacturing, the relationship of Nigeria to the process of transformation of global
division of labor becomes problematic. The issue centers on the political and economic
relations of Nigeria and the TNC within the NIDL.
The purpose of this study is, therefore, to assess the impact of the NIDL on
investment and employment in the manufacturing sector of the Nigerian economy. The
measures included the level of employment generation, the type of sectoral investment, the
amount of training and manpower development, and the utilization of labor quality in the
economy. Figures 1 and 2 show the module analysis and the statement of the problem
module, respectively. The investigation covered the period 1970-85. The study made a
detailed assessment of Nigeria's cuirent incorporation and integration processes.
Hypotheses
The theoretical framework suggested the following testable hypotheses:
1. The NIDL does not contribute to the solution of Nigeria's unemployment problem.
2. Investors do not invest in export-related industries that will attract the much-needed
hard currencies to stimulate the economy.
8"Nigerian Companies in Joint Ventures," West Africa. May 11-17,1992, p. 804.
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Figure 1. Module Analysis.
7
Figure 2. Statement of Problem Module.
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3. Nigerian workers are not given the training and skills necessary to develop the
country’s self-sustaining economic growth and development.
4. Higher wage rates offered by foreign companies to the labor market in Nigeria have
no effect on the availability of quality labor to the indigenous companies.
Data Collection
An extensive range of data was analyzed as part of this study, and included three
timeframes for practical reasons. First, to examine the historical development of
capitalism, the research focused on 1921-36 to assess the nature of foreign investments
when Nigeria was still under colonial rule by the British. Next, the 1960s illustrated the
developing countries' active participation in the export manufacturing world, and
highlighted by the growth in the manufacturing sector of Nigeria's economy from 1970 to
1985 in the form of import substitutions. The 1993 survey questionnaire thus
complements the previous two time periods, because these are not updated every year.
The physical growth of multinational corporations in Nigeria has been impressive.
This study is based on primary and secondary data. The primary data were aimed at
providing a partial benchmark for comparing investment and employment impacts of the
NIDL in Nigeria, as provided by the annual industrial survey of foreign investors by the
Nigerian Federal Office of Statistics, and the annual publication surveys of foreign private
investors compiled by the Central Bank of Nigeria. The survey covered manufacturing
establishments employing ten or more persons, giving information by a 3-digit code, the
International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) of all economic activities, on the
number of establishments, capital, total employment by category, value added, and so on.
Both publications were often outdated by many years.
An alternative strategy for comparing the investment and employment impact of
NIDL was to compare multinational corporations (MNC) with indigenous Nigerian
9
companies (IND). An indigenous Nigerian company is one which is founded and owned
by Nigerian citizens and managed either by such Nigerian or by a managerial staff
appointed by and responsible to the Nigerian.
To bridge the gap in the limited data available on this subject, a survey sample of 30
MNC and IND was performed using the 1990 Industrial Directory. The questionnaire
shown in the Appendix was administered by the researcher to the general manager or
personnel manager of each company visited.. To provide representative data for this study,
it is important to know the location of industries in the manufacturing sector in Nigeria.
Table 1 provides the trends and locations of manufacturing industries in 1965 and 1969
(one year prior to the starting year of this study).
As can be seen in Table 1, greater Lagos is by far the most important industrial
location in Nigeria. This industrial city accounted for 38 percent in 1965 and 50 percent in
1969 in the concentration of manufacturing industries in Nigeria. Kano, Kaduna, Port
Harcourt, Ibadan, and the Sapele area range from 6 to 10 percent, and Aba stands at 4
percent. It can be seen that these seven important locations accounted for approximately 80
percent in 1965. The shares of Zaria, Jos, Nkalagu, Ewekoro, Enugu, and Abeokuta
ranged from 1 to 3 percent; while Unuahia, Maiduguri, Onitsha, Ilorin, and Benin ranged
from 0.5 to 1 percent; 18 of these locations accounted for about 95 percent in 1965.
In 1969, the trends could also be observed with Kaduna (14 percent) and Kano (11
percent), followed by Ibadan (6 percent) and Sapele (4.5 percent). Zaria, Jos, and
Ewekoro ranged from 1 to 3 percent. Data for the cities in the eastern region were not
available at the time due to the Civil War.9
9Ludwig Shatzl, Industrialization in Nigeria (Munich, Germany: Welt Forum
Verlag, 1973), p. 233.
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TABLE 1
DEGREE OF INDUSTRIALIZATION AND LOCATION
OF MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES IN NIGERIA
Location Number of
Establishments %
Greater Lagos 167 37.8
Kano 43 9.8
Kaduna 36 8.1
Port Harcourt 34 7.6
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Total 468 100.0
Source: Ludwig Shatzl, Industrialization in Nigeria (Munich, Germany: Welt Forum
Verlag, 1973), p. 232.
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In consideration of these historical trends of manufacturing formation in Nigeria,
the researcher administered the survey sample questionnaire in the following cities: Lagos,
Kaduna, Ilorin, Benin, Sapele, Port Harcourt, Bauchi, Aba, Onitsha, Enugu, Nkalagu,
and Umuahia. Further primary data came from United Nations (UN) publications, the
World Development Report, and the Economic Commission for Africa. Secondary data
were collected from the Review of African Economy. Economic Development in Africa,
and Trans-African Forum. Several Nigerian magazines were also consulted: Courier.
Newsweek. West Africa. Guardian. Textbooks on international relations, the international
division of labor, and the world political economy were included in the study.
Theoretical and Conceptual Framework
A concrete analysis was required to critique the impact of the NIDL on investment
and employment in the manufacturing sector of the Nigerian economy to produce the
grounded research work for this study.
Most analysts generally agree that the NIDL is related to the structural
transformation of the world economy, as recognized in varying fashions since the wave of
recession and crises beginning in the early 1970s. Such institutional upheavals as the death
of the Bretton Woods System, the "oil shocks" of 1973-74 and their accompanying shifts
in investment capital, the competitive success of fully recovered Japanese and German
economies—all combined in the seemingly endless web of descriptors identifiable with the
NIDL. 10 The analysts also focus mostly on trade, especially on export platforms, and
imply that the international division of labor is new principally for its reversal of the
traditional division of labor in the international system. That is, the NIDL restructures the
system so that the previous hewers of wood and drawers of water, the Third World raw
material providers, started exporting to a substantial portion of the developed countries in
the form of manufactured and processed goods, as well as labor. Another interpretation of
12
the NIDL emphasizes the internationalization of the world economy as a function of the
expansion of capital and its valorization and reproduction at a global level. Rather than
treating the symptoms of change in the trade system, this structural analysis incorporates
the multinational or transnational capitals based on the gain from trade and productive
implications of international trade, to explain the internationalization of the world economy
through the expansion of production itself.^
This concept further suggests, however, that TNC are merely agents, perhaps the
most important ones of a process of international integration that crosses sectors and
transcends mere trade relations or the power of a single firm. This does not mean that the
internationalization of production eliminates concepts of nations and national economy. It
does suggest, however, that the proper strategy for understanding the character of the
NDDL involves the discovery of the specific mechanics of national insertion into the global
capitalist system.
The problem of focus and level of analysis, to agree on any of the above analyses,
remained. Following the above overview, the researcher sought a more specific conceptual
clarity into the NIDL than that contained in Sanderson.i2
The Internationalization of Capital Theory
Capitalism is now the dominant system of production. It is characterized by a
system of social relations in which small groups of people who control the means of
production employ relatively large numbers of people to produce the goods required for
their collective reproduction. Their goal is to accumulate capital by producing profits. To
lOStephen E. Sanderson, The Americas in the New International Division of Labor




achieve their objectives, capitalists attempt to control the state apparatus as well as the
institutions and mechanisms for technological innovation. They also strive to restructure
society and individual demands to make production more profitable while expanding the
market for their own profit
The social relations of capitalist production are characterized by conflict and crisis.
The constant struggle of the several classes (within and between groups) to advance their
own conflicting interests in controlling the social product is an inherent feature of capitalist
society. This struggle dominates the evolution of production, conditions technological
advances, and induces the appearance of new commodities during the continuing yet
uneven process of capitalist expansion. In Africa, the struggle frequently pits workers who
are uprooted from non-capitalist forms of production (e.g., artisans and farmers) against
the local bourgeoisie committed to introducing and accelerating the advance of capitalism.
Capitalist expansion has reorganized and extended production to an ever-
broadening range because of the imposition of its characteristic social relations. The
production-for-profit ideology encompasses new social groups, new sectors of production,
and new regions. This reorganizational process of traditional economies wrests control of
production from self-employed farmers and artisans, and new industrialized products are
substituted for homemade products. In this way, non-capitalist production is displaced by
modem processes and products which require the enlargement of the wage labor force as
the basis for capital's further expansion and control over society. The ability to sustain
itself for expansion depends on its ability to find new ways to accumulate capital to
promote its further growth. Normally, as capitalists expand their markets for existing
commodities, broaden the range of commodities they produce, and revolutionize their
techniques, they reduce the work process and the number of workers. Competition obliges
i3Ibid., p. 28.
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firms to expand and innovate, as well as emulate the latest advances of industry leaders.
Innovation and redevelopment are mechanisms that respond to worker organization and
social struggles in the mature economies, as capital searches for new sources of surplus
value.
This internationalization of capital process offered the best framework within which
this study analyzed the growth process and its internal contradictions. At its initial stage,
capital expanded internationally in search of new markets and new resources of labor
power to employ in producing saleable commodities. In its international expansion, capital
from the mature capitalist economies joined with national capitals everywhere. This meant
building new productive apparatuses for manufacturing goods for world trade as well as
local markets that emerged in the developing countries. This internationalizing process was
a response to competition and to the sector of declining profit rates, thereby leading to the
standardization of production that required producers to keep abreast of and respond to
innovations by competitors. At the same time, it led to differentiation of products and
techniques as each firm worked assiduously to get ahead by introducing new commodities,
or changing production methods so as to increase its rate of profit.In order to explain
the effect of this internationalization of capital, the researcher used the theory of imperialism
described in the Marxist-Leninist ideology (Figure 3). In his discussion on the
internationalization of capital by the capitalist system, Lenin argued that capitalism was only
interested in the highest rate of return. In the advanced stage of development, the centers
of capital became more saturated with investment, and the rate of return on new
investments was relatively low. In this process, less-developed portions of the world
i4Walter S. Jones, The Logic of International Relations (Glenview, IL: Scott
Foresman, 1988), p. 8.
isibid.
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Figure 3. Theoretical framework and Hypothesis Module.
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lagged behind in raising the level of exploitive efficiency, so that new capital would realize
a higher rate of return. Therefore, capitalists began to compete with each other for
investment opportunities and concomitant influence around the world. Imperialism, in this
model, was mainly a search for high return investment opportunities for surplus capital.i^
The author defined imperialism as the monopoly stage of capitalism, and included the
following essential features:
1. The concentration of production and capital developed to such a high stage
that it created monopolies which play a decisive role in economic life.
2. The merging of bank capital with industrial capital, and the creation, on the
basis of this "finance capital," of a "financial oligarchy."
3. The export of capital, which has become extremely important as
distinguished from the export of commodities.
4. The formation of international capitalist monopolies which share the world
among themselves.
5. The territorial division of the whole world among the greatest capitalist
powers is completed.17
In this process, imperialism became capitalism in the stage of development in which
the dominance of monopolies and finance capital established itself; in which the export of
capital acquired pronounced importance; in which the division of the world among the
international trusts began; and in which the division of all the territories of the globe among
the great capitalist powers was completed.is
The other factor cited by the theorists of imperialism to explain the
internationalization of capital was the search for markets for surplus production. This
suggested that the capitalist system of production rested on a fundamental inefficiency in
distribution. In this case, the workers had to be paid less than the full value of their
i6Ibid.
i7Paul R. Viotti and Mar V. Kauppi, International Relations Theories: Realism.




product if the capitalist was to retain a large share of production for profits. This made the
workers unable to buy all that they produced. So, in addition to providing investment
opportunities, less-developed countries could be made captive markets under the influence
of matured capitalist countries. This historical analysis could also be seen in the trends of
capitalist expansion, discussed in Chapter II.
A third reason for the internationalization of capitalism by the theorists of
imperialism was the need to control the richest sources of raw materials.20 Monopoly
capital thus minimized the cost of production by suppressing wages and developing the
cheapest sources of supply. The bounties of nature located in the underdeveloped world
became important prizes for international capital.
This study has investigated whether internationalization of capital reduced Nigeria
to the status of supplier of raw materials and cheap labor, as well as becoming the captive
center of foreign investment and import dependency. The position of the imperialist
theorists on this view is that capitalists reinforce their international position with a
preponderance of physical might, controlling the governments of their own states and using
this power to secure their own positions internationally. Further, according to these
theorists, much of the international law was written by imperial states to protect their
position. An example was the 1885 Treaty of Berlin, in which the European powers
delineated the future legal borders within Africa.
Radical critics of imperialism do not accept the premise of capitalism as an
appropriate basis for organizing the economy and society at either the national or
international level. Thus, although the growth of MNC or TNC may logically follow from
capitalism, radical critics focus on the disadvantages and evils of such companies and
20Jones, The Logic of International Relations, op. cit., p. 9.
18
capitalism in general for parent and host states, as well as the international system 21 They
view the abolition of capitalism, either in parent states or in host states (according to
dependency theorists) as the only sure way to control MNC.
The classical liberal theorists, on the other hand, typically stress that the benefits of
direct investment outweigh some of its admittedly negative aspects. They feel that the
problems associated with foreign investment can be alleviated or eliminated through more
sensitive state and corporate policies. To them, the MNC and TNC are a logical and
rational step in the evolution of capitalism and not a conspiracy among capitalists to
dominate the world; rather, it is a response to opportunities for the pursuit of business
activities in other countries. An opponent to this ideology, Harry Magdoff, stated that,
"The underlying purpose of imperialism is nothing less than keeping as much as possible
of the world open for trade and investment by the giant multinational corporations."22
This study examines the principal changes since the 1970s as the period which
accelerated the internationalization of capital, with insight on TNC as the key agents in the
international spread of technology, new commodities, and new forms for organizing
production. It is important to emphasize that it is not TNC themselves which are the cause
of the transformations described by the NIDL. However, the role being played by MNC
and TNC in international arena brings into question whether the internationalization of
capital has induced any structural transformations which promote the articulation of national
capitalist economies into a coherent unified global system.
On this aspect of relationship between Nigeria and capitalist investment, this
researcher questions if there is a lack of political dimension in the creation of world markets
2iDavid H. Blake and Robert S. Walters, The Politics of Global Economic
Relations (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1987), p. 104.
22ibid., p. 206.
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for production sites, without unifying both social and political dimensions. This
relationship suggests that the capitalists assume a political unity in world economy, and
give priority to the elements of the NIDL in structuring world capitalism. This kind of
determinism is quite appropriate to the dependency assumptions of the center-periphery
model of the world capitalist structure, which can encourage an economistic approach to
world capitalist relations. This approach is exemplified in the following statement:
This new international division of labor is an institutional . . . innovation of
capital itself necessitated by changed conditions, and not the result of changed
development strategies by individual countries or options freely decided upon
by so-called multinational companies. It is a consequence and not a cause of
these new conditions that various countries and companies have to tailor their
policies and profit-maximizing strategies to these new conditions (that is, to the
requirements of the world market for industrial sites).23
In this approach, the countries are being considered as actors, and capital loses its
class location in its country. The debate on the content of the global unity, in which the
NIDL is taking place, requires analysis of both historical aspects and current processes of
the internationalization of capital within the global economy. This debate centers on the
rationale of having a continuing primary producing/manufacturing international social
division of labor among geopolitical regions, and superimposed upon this historic pattern
the presence of the NIDL corresponding to the goal and requirements of the transnational
production as the internationalization of productive capital proceeds. The principles of this
TNC division of labor are essentially, as Stephen Hymer put it, "To maintain the separation
between work and control, capital has erected elaborate corporate superstructures to unite
labor in production, but divide it in power. "24 It is this researcher's opinion that, in this
debate, what constitutes world unity determines the fulfillment by which the NIDL will
23Edward Friedman, Ascent and Decline in the World System (Beverly Hills, CA:
Sage Publications, 1982), p. 118.
24S. Hymer and R. B. Cohen, The Multinational Corporation: A Radical Approach
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. 22.
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operate in unifying the social, political, and technical dimensions. If one argues the world
system—with its three-tiered political structure of center, periphery, and semiperiphery
(i.e., if one presumes permanent geopolitical categories into which different states may
fall)—one might conclude that, "World market-oriented industrialization of the
underdeveloped countries through the establishment of free production zones and world
market facilities has not meant any change in the historical process of underdevelopment,
but in fact in its deepening. "25
The issue of a semiperiphery in the international economy presents two aspects.
Wallerstein emphasized that, from a political point of view, it was clear that a system which
is basically unequal in nature needs a safety valve through which pressures from below can
be neutralized. A middle category, like semiperiphery, serves this purpose by opening up
possibilities for advancement for countries in the periphery.26 This semiperiphery must be
understood within the context of the ongoing restructuring of the international capitalist
system and the resulting NIDL into which Nigeria was absorbed. The structural crisis of
the international economy, evident in the 1970s, exerted substantial pressure on the
industrialized countries, demanding new conditions for continued expansion of these
economies. This is further explained by major dependency theories on political economy.
Karl Marx described the process by which money and commodities transformed into
capital, where the owners of money and the means of production confronted workers.
The capitalist system presupposes the complete separation of the laborers from
all property in the means by which they can realize their labor. As soon as the
capitalist production is on its own legs, it not only maintains this separation, but
reproduces it on a continually extending scale.22
25Frobel, et al.. The New International Division of Labour, op. cit., p. 403.
26Jerker Carlsson, South-South Relations in a Changing World Order (Uppsala,
Sweden: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1982), p. 11.
27Ronald H. Chicote, Theories of Comparative Politics (Boulder, CO: Westview
Press, 1981), p. 412.
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This view assumes that imperialism is the factor that shapes capitalist expansion. It
argues that this process clears the way for the capitalist system to take away from the
laborers the possession of their means of production. This process transforms the social
means of subsistence and of production into capital, and turns the immediate producers into
wage laborers. Thus, the political economy of the dependency theorists fundamentally
addresses this broad historical sweep of capitalism and its exploitive nature.
It is on this background of capitalist accumulation and expansion that the researcher
became compelled to adopt the internationalization of capital as the best explanation for the
position of Nigeria within the NIDL. This approach encourages the understanding of the
international mobility of resources, the international transfer of technology, and the global
spread of the social relations of capitalist production, because they are integral parts of the
social and productive dimensions of the dynamic world economy. Also, competition
intensified as oligopolistic firms became better able to defend their interests, and national
capitals everywhere had to become internationalized in order to survive. The national
attempt to abrogate or modify the international laws of capital accumulation constantly
changed the pace of global expansion, and these local efforts failed to alter the underlying
pattern of expansion.
For this study, the internationalization of capital must be understood as a dynamic
process of reproduction and growth. Within the less integrated parts of the system
(sectors, regions, social groupings), the process of capitalist accumulation led to
modification of productive structures, social relations, and even commodities.28 This
helped explain local as well as international production. It was assumed that the local
accumulation processes were guided by the general laws of production and reproduction.
28lbid., p. 414.
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although each was unique because local sociopolitical, productive, and technical
circumstances left a distinctive imprint on the universal drive to expand the capitalist market
and increase the profit rate, tempting further penetration of capitalist expansion.
The theory, furthermore, emphasized how the internationalization of capital worked
to remake society systematically in capital's image. The researcher was aware of forces at
work on this transformation. Capitalist expansion was clearly incapable of productively
absorbing the available labor pool into the proletariat, and most government were unable
and unwilling to finance the social welfare programs. For all these reasons, the underlying
tendency toward the internationalization of capital and the creation of a global proletariat
had to be understood as tendencies, as social phenomena which provoked their own
opposition and which would inevitably create greatly differing results in each country.29
Statement of Significance
The growth of Nigeria's economy is obviously an attractive concept. First, it
would make Nigeria, on the average, richer, thus more generally interesting to investors.
Second, it would give the entire continent more prestige and influence, recognition, and
power in the world. That, too, requires investigation as to the future of this association and
its expectations.
What really defines the membership of Nigeria within the NIDL? As trade is the
obvious answer, it becomes necessary for the nature of goods bought and sold to determine
the "real" membership. The significance of this study was to re-examine the nature of the
capitalist countries; investments in Nigeria, and contribute an intellectual analysis of the
pros and cons of internationalization of capital and its impact on Nigeria.
34.
29Sanderson, The Americas in the New International Division of Labor, op. cit., p.
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Therefore, the study was aimed at providing the academic community with an
overall understanding of the emerging NIDL and its implications in the Third World
economy. The researched hoped thereby to provide future guidance for researchers in this
field, and help Nigerian decision-makers to construct and formulate national policies that
will benefit from the NIDL and lead to way to continued improvement of the economy.
Methodology
Foreign investors have an enormous impact on the economy of most countries. But
what has been their contribution to the economic development of Nigeria, particularly in the
area of investment and employment. This is the heart of this study. How do these
contributions compare those of IND with the overall goal of Nigerian development? The
most recent National Survey available (1990) shows that there were 6,990 establishments
with a total employment of 462,785 workers. This figure represented both foreign and
indigenous establishments employing 10 or more individuals. Thus, they provided
meaningful information on the impact of NIDL on investment and employment in the
manufacturing sector of the Nigerian economy.
A survey sample of 30 companies, both MNC and IND, was selected using the
1990 Industrial Directory of Industries in Nigeria. Although it uses establishments, this
study used the term "company." Since an establishment is a subset of a company,
establishment will tend to show a smaller labor force.
A major purpose of many social scientific studies is to describe situations and
events.30 The descriptive approach relies heavily on scientific data. Using a case study
and employing this technique ensures a systematic analysis of the various events and
concerns. The units of analysis being investigated in this study are the individuals and the
techniques and methods they employ to meet their objectives within the world political
economy. The researcher, therefore, took the descriptive approach in his investigation in
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his analysis of the cause and effects under study. Through this approach, analysis can be
directed at obtaining relevant findings to contribute to a better understanding of the issues.
As the nature of the field under study was still very young, the researcher had to delve deep
in order to establish data for future work in this area.
The measurement was operationalized by administering survey questionnaires
measuring the number of employment generation (Figure 4), the wage rate effect (Figure5), the nature of manpower development and training provided to Nigerian workers (Figure6), and the nature and type of manufacturing investments (Figure 7). The questionnaires
were used with many models of observation in social research, but were essential to and
most directly associated with survey research.31 Self-administered questionnaires were
helpful in dealing with sensitive issues. Furthermore, questionnaires are known to have an
important strength with regard to measurement.32
The questionnaire used in this study was designed to measure the effects of SEMW
factors to determine the nature of investments and employment in Nigeria through the
presence of MNC and TNC. The researcher developed the SEMW acronym as follows;
S = Sectoral investment
E = Employment generation
M = Manpower development and training
W = Wage rate
The objective of this method was that it would touch all the aspects of the study and
embrace the root of the social problems—economic, labor, political structure, etc. It would
also show the interrelationship between these social issues within them, and how these
forces interacted with their global components.
30Earl Babbie, The Practice of Social Research (Glenview, CA: Wadsworth,
1989), p. 75.
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Question #8 Question #9
Figure 4. Employment in Manufacturing and Employment
Generation.
26
Question #18 Question #19
Figure 5. Employment in Manufacturing and Wage Rate.
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Question #10 Question #11 Question #12
Figure 6. Employment in Manufacturing and Manpower
Development and Training.
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Question #3 Question #14 Question #15 Question #16 QuestionlS
Figure 7. Investment In Manufacturing And Activity Type of
Manufacturing.
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This researcher is convinced that the world system is a working social system larger
than any state, whose operations are themselves a focus of social analysis, and neither
should any region be isolated or treated differently from such global forces. The manner in
which states, firms, classes, and social institutions functioned within the framework and
constraints of the world system was the selected topic of investigation of this overall
analysis, particularly from the angle of the implications and the crisis of these variables in





This chapter examines the capitalist development and the crisis inherent in the
developmental process at the global level, and the manifestations of this development at the
national level in Nigeria leading to the tendency toward the NIDL. This development and
the relationship between the crisis and the restructuring of the means of production was a
central issue in Marxist theory. This economic restructuring exercise was undertaken in
response to the sluggish world economic crises of the late 1960s and early 1970s at the
global level, and led to a spatial restructuring into different geographical scales, in turn
leading to the tendency toward the NIDL. The issues discussed below are intended to
explain the position of Nigeria within the ongoing NIDL. The researcher wishes to point
out, however, that the history of capitalism was not really a smooth economic undertaking,
although it triumphed more than any other system of economic production as witnessed by
the collapse of the communist economic system of the Soviet Union. This chapter clarifies
the argument at the global and national levels with implications for Nigeria.
Chapter III discusses the practice of their system of production and the Nigerian
investment practices.
Historical Movement of Capitalism and the
Trends of the Capitalist Movement
Historical Capitalism is, thus, that concrete, time-bounded, space-bounded
integrated locus of productive activities within which the endless accumulation
30
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of capital has been the economic objective of law that has governed or
prevailed in fundamental economic activity. It is that Social System in which
those who have operated by such rules have had such great impact on the
whole as to create conditions wherein the others have been forced to conform
to the patterns or to suffer the consequences. It is that Social System in which
the scope of these rules (the law of nature) has grown even wider, the
enforcers of these rules ever more intransigent, the penetration of these rules
into the social fabric even greater, even while social opposition to these rules
has grown even louder and more organized. i
The capitalist world economy expands and contracts in what are called upswing and
downswing cycles. This characterizes the changes in the organizational structure of the
basic capitalist enterprise (Table 2).
During periods of economic upswing and boom, such as occurred in 1848-73 and
1945-73, the capitalist enterprise expanded through enlarging the basic firm. During
periods of downswing and economic bust, as in the Great Depression of 1873-96, the
enterprise also grew but through mergers of a number of different firms. Those years
witnessed the appearance of the modern corporation and a transition from the more
competitive capitalism of the earlier nineteenth-century family firm to the monopoly
capitalism of the large-scale, multiunit corporation.^
The next sustained expansion of world capitalism came with the great boom period
of 1945-73. With this upswing in the world economy came the firms growing through
expansion. The corporations expanded their operations overseas and came to be known as
MNC, which led the tendency toward the NIDL.
With the 1974-75 recession and continuing through the more severe recession of
1980 to the present, there appeared another period of sluggish growth and a general crisis
ilmmanuel Wallerstein, The Political Economy of Contemporary Africa (Norfolk,
England: Melford Press, 1983), p. 18.
2Edward Friedman, Ascent and Decline in the World System (Beverly Hills, CA:
Sage Publications, 1982), pp. 27-28.
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TABLE 2
ECONOMIC CYCLES AND THE CHANGING SIZE
OF INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISE






1790-1873 Upswing Expansion of basic
organizational structure
Family firm












Source; Albert Bergesen, in Edward Friedman, Ascent and Decline in the World System
(Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1982), p. 27.
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in accumulation that would accompany another wave of mergers, such as MNC with MNC
and, more significantly, MNC with some state enterprises. This study concentrated on the
process that involved the causal interrelationship of economic expansion and contraction
within the capitalist world economy. It was a witness to the very expression of expansion
of business that occurred historically during upswings, which planted the seeds for
excessive drive for competition and overproduction.
The ultimate resolution of this blockage in the accumulation process was crisis and
downturn, where the failure of individual firms and the elimination of others through
mergers allowed the accumulation process to move forward again. This "boom-and-bust"
wave inherent in the capitalist system not only restructured industries but also pitted
workers against owners.
The period of the 1970s to the present indicated that the capitalist world economy
was going through a period of contraction and depression which resulted in a slowdown of
expansion of industrial productive capacity. Through this unfolding dilemma, the NIDL
intensified, and required the relocation of world income to increase demand and re-create
the conditions for a further significant expansion of the forces of production.
The MNC are probably the most visible vehicles for this relocation process and the
internationalization of the world economic system. As the economies of different nations
became increasingly linked and integrated, the MNC seemed to become the institution best
able to adapt to a transnational style of operation.
As used in this study, MNC are all firms—industrial, service, and financial—doing
international business of all types within a myriad or organizational structures.
"Multinational Corporations are a major result of and a prime stimulus for furthering the
number and complexity of transnational interactions and relationships."3
3Blake and Walters, The Politics of Global Economic Relations, op. cit., p. 94.
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The behavior and conduct of MNC in the international arena have both economic
and political concerns because of their impact on domestic as well as international systems.
Many industrialized countries are concerned at companies who invest abroad, leaving their
home country with unemployment. Some unions have attempted to obtain government
action to reduce the ease with which corporations invest abroad. In various host countries,
MNC have been accused of economic imperialism, fostering intercountry competition, and
practicing unsavory business activities. In general, they have become the most visible and
the most attacked members of the global economic system. However, at the same time,
almost every country in the world would like foreign MNC, including the advanced
capitalist countries, to invest in their country. Thus, they offer every incentive to attract
them.
The debate on foreign capital investment in developing countries after World War
II, and particularly since the 1970s, and the drive toward accumulation as a means of
economic development, has been very intensive because of the crises inherent in this
developmental exercise. The main debate centers primarily on different ideological beliefs
and value judgments as to the meaning, nature, and processes that lead to economic benefit
for the recipient countries.
While the proponents of foreign capital tend to believe in the efficient functioning of
the free market system with no government intervention, the opponents are motivated by
the desire for national control over major and strategic domestic economic activities and
minimization of dominance and dependence on all foreign sources of capital, particularly
private capital investment.
There is no doubt that such investments improve the economy of developing
countries. However, the concentration of such financial power in the weak economies of
developing areas such as Nigeria can threaten the country's national and political stability,
as well as its independence and autonomy in the management of its economy.
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At the international structural level, the multinational corporations and the
multinational capitalism dominate both directly and indirectly the center and the
periphery, and the characteristics of the relationship between the center on the
one hand and the periphery on the other hand is asymmetric. In the MNC's
overall process of dominance and exploitation, the state apparatus of the
developed countries come forward with administrative, legislative, economic,
political, and military measures and intervention. The uncontrolled
accumulation, development, and promotion of capital and technology during the
last three decades has enabled the industrial financial commercial capitalism to
attain the power of dominance and control to such an extent that it can control
this influence, and guide both the national and international state apparatus in its
interests. Through product development, the MNC capitalism creates new
demands and again, through mass production on giving social character to
production, it also controls die supply function to social demands of most of the
nations. Since the needs-satisfaction, in our highly monetized modern
societies, depends on the possession of purchasing power or income, the
MNC's capitalism has succe^ed in exercising control over the price mechanism
on the one hand and the demand and supply on the other hand in such a way
that the realization of profit is maximized.^
The concern is that MNC always choose capital-intensive techniques in the
developing world; that is only good to their companies but not to that country as a whole.
Thus, they constitute the most advanced form of capitalist production and, as such,
illustrate many of the tendencies of the development of the capitalist system. This retarded
the local semi-intensive techniques and caused unemployment on a huge scale. Despite
nationalization and indigenization decrees, MNC dominate major exports of developing
countries such as oil, copper, bauxite, bananas, tea, coffee, cocoa, to name but a few. A
report of the third meeting of the Advisory Group on Economic Matters (sponsored by the
Commission on the Churches' Participation in Development, World Council of Churches,
Geneva) on TNC technology and human development stated the following:
TNCs are profit-oriented and so is their use of technology. The transnationality
of business has allowed TNCs to act to reduce costs and maximize growth and
profits on a global scale. They go where costs of production are lowest and
expected gains highest. They can, therefore, benefit from the low cost of labor
4G. Amalanda and A. Vivekananda, Development Alternative (Stockholm, Sweden:
Bethany Books, 1985), p. 210.
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and from the political and economic vulnerability of third world and weaker
industrial countries, and can shift investments and technology according to the
logic of global interests, even if these shifts prove harmful to the level of
employment and the balance of payments to their countries of origin.5
It can be seen that the debates about developing countries at the international arena
using MNC in this internationalization process of capital were full of promises as well as
frightening. For example, some major scholars from Latin America suggested that what
was needed in the peripheral states such as Africa was the "do-it-yourself method; i.e., a
non-foreign system that could address African countries' needs in their own way.^
Some authors suggested that few African states with labor and critical raw materials
would emerge as potential prospects in the NIDL. According to Wallerstein,
semiperipheral countries like South Africa, Zaire, Nigeria, Algeria, and Egypt would
emerge as significant producers of industrial products not only for their home markets but
also for their neighboring countries.^ This increased income would represent part of the
worldwide expansion of effective demand for the products of the core countries. If Nigeria
had been sucked into the world economy at this stage, in such a subordinate situation, then
the NEDL could be interpreted as a masked type of industrialization. A situation exists
wherein the Ivory Coast imports French Peugeot cars assembled in Nigeria, and Nigeria
imports from the Ivory Coast building materials manufactured by French companies in
Abidjan. All serve the interest of the core countries, while undermining the economic
growth of the recipient country. Higgott argued, on the same platform, that the prospect of
5Report of the Meeting of the Advisory Group on Economic Matters, held in Rome,
Italy, October 1980, sponsored by the Commission on the Churches' Participation in
Development, World Council of Churches, Geneva, Switzerland (Geneva, Switzerland:
World Council of Churches, 1976), p. 30.
6Ferrel Heady, Public Administration: A Comparative Perspective (New York:
Marcel Dekker, 1984), p. 127.
7Wallerstein, The Political Economy of Contemporary Africa, op. cit., p. 296.
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African incorporation extended at best to only a few states, notably Nigeria, Ivory Coast,
Kenya, Algeria, and Egypt^
There are numerous reasons why so many people think that it is difficult to
incorporate Africa into the ongoing NIDL. One of the reasons stems from the small market
size, too small for TNC to invest in except when they operate on a regional scale. Another
factor is political conduciveness. According to Higgott, the weakness of Africa's state
structures and its largely anticapitalist ideology—even in governments coupled with its
ethnic, religion, and regional problems—made Africa unattractive for the West to risk its
investments.^ Colonial linkage was another factor quoted in the literature. According to
Ndongko, Africa still has much in common with its former colonial masters, and most of
these Europeans are core competitors of some of these MNC.^o In most cases, African
orientation in the ongoing division of labor has been one of agricultural or raw material
producer, and not a manufacturer of goods. In fact, production of finished goods for
export or of components for assembly abroad is rare. Most African manufacturing is in the
area of light consumer goods for the home market.
The Use of OPEC as Leverage by the Third World
in Negotiating for a New Division of Labor
The question that always comes to mind is why the Third World countries have
failed to maximize their position in global economic and political relations despite abundant
natural resources. The dispute over the command and acquisition of their economic
resources on this issue varies. It may be the result of their own social-political-economic
^Higgott, "Africa and the NIDL," op. cit., p. 290.
9lbid., p. 296.
10Wilfred A. Ndongko, Africa and Third World Economic Development
(Stockholm: Bethany Books, 1988), pp. 23-24.
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choices, or of a conscious policy on the part of advanced industrial states to exploit them
over several centuries, or of the rich states' preoccupation with economic relations among
themselves and their relative neglect of the impact of these relations on the poor states of the
Third World. It is important at this point to address the only alternative strategy that the
Third World has ever employed for their share of the benefits of international economy.
The oil cartel administered through the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC) has been the most successful exercise of leverage utilized by the
periphery in the global political economy resulting in the demands for a New International
Economic Order (NIEO) in the UN.
The starting point of this OPEC-NIEO dichotomy overview should be the UN,
because it is the only vehicle that unites both the Third World and the developed world into
common agreements to rules governing the world community. It is also the center of
analysis, because it is a vehicle to carry out international law. The NIEO was a political
and economic call by the Third World countries demanding a reformation of the existing
economic order within the UN formed by the industrialized countries in 1944 at Bretton
Wood. "The developed countries should encourage investors to finance industrial
production projects, particularly export-oriented production, in developing countries, in
agreement with the latter and within the context of their laws and regulations."!! Since its
goal was to effect a new international economic structure so as to increase the share of the
developing countries in world industrial production, the politicoeconomic forces shaping
the global division of labor had to be analyzed. The understanding of the NIEO lies in the
principles governing the UN and how these principles affected the Third World.
The original purpose of the UN was to maintain international peace and security
through the specific settlement of disputes, as witnessed by the two World Wars. The
!!Friedman, Ascent and Decline in the World System, op. cit., p. 115.
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preamble to its Charter called for the UN to promote social progress and a better standard
of living, and to employ the international machinery to promote the socioeconomic progress
of all people. Article 13, for example, provided for the General Assembly to initiate
studies and make recommendations for, among other things, international economic
cooperation. Article 22 provided for the General Assembly to establish such subsidiary
organs as it felt necessary for the performance of its functions.*2 Articles 55 through 60
addressed international socioeconomic cooperation, and Articles 61 through 72 established
the socioeconomic council (ECOSOC) as one of the principal organs of the UN.13
The call for NIEO was led by the demand of the OPEC states for the convening of
the seventh special session of the UN General Assembly, a few months after the oil price
hikes and the Arab oil embargo of 1973, to address the problems of raw materials and
development in the Third World.i^ One of the subjects at this session was the UN's
"Declaration on Establishment of a New International Economic Order," which was of
particular interest to all Third World States.
The essence of this official demand for a new order is a call for the
redistribution of the world's wealth and economic opponunities, reparations to
foreign-dominated states, and restmcturing of the international economic system
and its institutions to guarantee that the interests of developing states are directly
taken into account. The new order is to be based on the principles of equity,
sovereign equality, interdependence, common interests and cooperation among
states. 15
i2Leland M. Goodrich, Edward Hambro, and Ann Patricia Simons, Charter of the
United Nations: Commentary and Documents (New York: Columbia University Press,
1969), pp. 186-191.
i3Burton Y. Pines, A World Without the UN Heritage (Washington, DC: Heritage
Foundation, 1984), p. 2.
i^Blake and Walters, The Politics of Global Economic Relations, op. cit., pp. 185-
186.
15C. B. Gwin, "The Seventh Special Session Toward a New Phase of Relations
Between Developed and the Developing States," in R. Mortimer, ed.. The Third World
Coalition in International Politics (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984), p. 100.
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OPEC states declined western initiatives during 1974 to negotiate an orderly oil
production and pricing scheme to reduce turmoil in the international economy. This was
the first time that the Third World challenged the world economic system in a decisive
form. Through this opportunity, OPEC succeeded in creating negotiations based on an
expanded agenda that addressed the gamut of less-developed countries' commodity trade,
industrialization, international financing interests, as well as oil production and pricing.
Further, the OPEC states linked the threat of further oil price increases in late 1975 to the
western states' willingness to negotiate seriously with the Third World within the larger
framework. 16 Indeed, OPEC demonstrated its capacity to employ the oil weapon with
political success. The following demands of the Third World through the NIEO were vital
to this study:
1. Liberalization and extension of the generalized System of Preferences for
less-developed countries' exports of manufactured and semi-manufactured
goods to advance industrial states.
2. An increase in the less-developed countries' share of the world's industrial
output to 25 percent by the year 2000.
3. Development of an enhanced research and development capacity within less-
developed countries.
4. Enhancement of science and technology transfers more appropriate to the
particular needs of less-developed countries at reduced cost.
5. International regulation of multinational firms to prevent their most
pernicious impacts on the social, cultural, economic, and political development
of poor states. 17
In addition, the NIEO demanded alterations in the standard of conduct and norms
governing economic relations such as resource transfers, possession and disposal of their
wealth and natural resources, and their overall economic activity. Another dimension of
less-developed countries' demand for NIEO involved institutional reforms to enhance their




Most Third World countries had not obtained independence when the major
international economic institutions were established after World War II, and were thus
unable to exercise much influence over the formulation of international law or the operation
of international organizations affecting directly their conduct within the new international
economic relations. So what were the advanced capitalist countries expected to do within
the framework of the NIEO? In fact, a new international order along the lines advocated by
less-developed countries would constitute wholesale redistribution of resources and
politicoeconomic power in the international system from the advanced industrial states of
the West to countries in the Third World. For this reason, western capitalist states could
not be expected to move voluntarily toward a comprehensive implementation of the NIEO.
The western states were opposed to a massive restructuring of international economic
institutions and the norms of behavior that, in their view, had served most states well. The
advanced industrial states would rather respond to the NIEO demands by agreeing to highly
specific selective reforms in international trade, finance, or investment relations that took
into greater account the particular economic needs of less-developed countries, and with
which the most-developed countries were in agreement. The United States, in particularly,
were opposed to the NIEO assumption that underdevelopment was primarily a result of the
present inequities in the international economic system, but rather felt that the problem lay
in obstacles of the less-developed countries' domestic policies.is
So what was new about NEEO demands? For one thing, it provided a political
legitimacy and a more coherent rationalization for bolder regional and national policies of
less-developed countries in their foreign economic relations as a collective entity. The
whole process of the NIEO demands by the Third World countries from the 1974 "oil
shock," through the 1974 sixth session of the General Assembly and to the 1975 seventh
isibid., p. 197.
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session of the General Assembly, resulted in bargaining between the rich and the poor
countries in terms of industrialization, science and technology, food and agriculture, and
the reorganization of the UN's social and economic structures. Robert Mortimer
summarized it as follows: "The whole process from September 1973 to September 1975
further developed a division of labor between the two Third World negotiators, the group
of 77 and the non-aligned groups in their pursuit."i9 Such a division of labor was
particularly apparent as the two negotiators were trying at least to get something from the
industrialized countries. Thus, the UN Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO)
became the instrument of the UN in channeling these developmental strategies to the Third
World. The platform adopted at the Algiers meeting called for UNIDO's renovation in the
following form:
The new division of industrial activities envisaged in the New International
Economic Order should permit all the developing countries to industrialize with
the aid of an effective international institution.... It is therefore necessary to
enlarge the attributions and field of activities of the UNIDO and ... to develop
substantially its autonomy and resources. . . . Towards this end, it is
recommended that UNIDO be transformed into a specialized agency.20
UNIDO's activities were designed to include research, training, pilot projects, surveys,
technical aids, data gathering, analysis, and exchange of information.
The outcome was that the Third World emerged with at least a sound collective
bargaining platform with regard to the NIEO demands. It appears, however, that they did
not accomplish their best expectations. One profound consequence of this process was that
it intensified the tendency toward NIDL with UNIDO as a vehicle of implementation. This
resulted in a wide variety of methods of capitalist penetration into Third World economic
systems through such means as free production zones practiced in the Third World. The
i9Robert Mortimer, The Third World Coalition in International Politics (Boulder,
CO: Westview Press, 1984), p. 70.
20ibid., p. 62.
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free production zones and the world market factories represented a new element in NIDL.
The purpose was to create production sites for the industrial utilization of labor forces of
the developing countries for the purpose of world market oriented production.21
The industrial utilization of the labor forces of the underdeveloped countries for
such production took place in world market factories, and the factory of the free production
zones in the world market factories. The worldwide tendency toward industrialization of
underdeveloped countries was part of the process within the structural tendency toward
NIDL. Hence, the free production zones revealed that the tendency was toward world
market industrialization. Furthermore, it created competition as countries used every
incentive to attract investors. UNIDO was, thus, the main agent in facilitating this free
production zone internationally as a logical requirement for development. Its concept of the
free production zone with its worldwide applications was outlined in UNIDO's basic
document,22 whose content was nothing more than a valorization process of capital. The
selection of sites and the establishment of free production zones, their provision with
equipment and an infrastructure, the removal of the granting of investment incentives, were
all justified, derived, and advocated from the point of view of the interests of private
capitalist companies. The document quite clearly emerged from the problems of the
valorization of capital, which have continued unabated by increasing international
competition. Five spheres were identified in which free production zones would provide
the capitalist system with world market production. Thus, foreign manufacturers with
world markets, particularly pressed by the increasing level of labor cost on the one hand
2iLeroy Bennett, International Organizations (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall,
1988), p. 245.
22UNIDO, Industrial Free Zone as Incentive to Promote Export-Oriented
Industries. Training Workshop on Industrial Free Zones, ID/WG 112/3, October 28,
1971, Lagos, Nigeria.
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and the sharpening of the international and national competition on the other, were seeking
ways and means to cut down or minimize their manufacturing and distribution costs.
Should they advance their base of manufacturing to a suitable free zone? Some of the
following might have been factors in their decision:
(a) Cutdown of raw material transportation costs;
(b) Cutdown of finished products transportation costs;
(c) Cutdown of labor costs;
(d) Availability of abundant qualified labor power;
(e) Reduction of initial investment cost and consequently lower percentage
of so-called sleeping capital, through the available fiscal and physical
incentives, common and general services and other preferential
treatments provided in the zone, etc.23
As a basic structure for free production zones, UNIDO recommended technical
equipment, commercial, and financial incentives:
• Full exemption of duties and taxes for a certain given period, on all
machineries and production equipments as well as on the raw materials and
components required for production activities in the zone....
• Income tax exemption of 5 to 10 years....
• A special period of holiday or reduction on other direct and indirect taxes,
surtaxes, surcharges, etc., payable by enterprises if not located in the free
zone.
• Freedom of foreign exchange control with a guarantee of the same status in
the future, and with the assurance of free repatriation of earned profits up to
a certain fixed annual rate of percentage.
• Preferential financing facilities, such as the provision of short, medium and
long-term loans with advantageous rates of interest, provided they are
required for the establishment of the industries in the zone, including the
construction of non-standard factory buildings.
• Preferential tariff rates on transportation costs between the zone and the sea-
or airports of arrival or departure in the country, as well as on the cost of
utilities, rents of ground and buildings (standard factory buildings),
common and generd services charges, etc.
• Possibilities of renting or purchasing preconstructed standard factories and
office buildings or spaces, according to the wishes of the industries. This
could relieve the investors ft'om spending their investment capital on long¬




• The availability of work and repairships, canteens, medical services or
clinics, banking services, post and telecommunication services, petrol
stations, patrol and security services, public warehouses, transportation and
forwarding agent services, cooperative insurance services, recreation
facilities, etc., all established in the zone for the benefit of the inhabitants
and their workers, would amount to a considerable portion of reducing the
work as well as the initial investment to bring a kind of physical incentive to
the investors.24
In response to the above, the multinationals operating in all the free production
zones were equipped with the features suggested by UNIDO. It was this combination of
features, together with production exclusively for the world market, which came to
distinguish free production zones from other industrial sites in developing countries, while
endowing the zones with their special enclave nature. The provision of a modern
infrastructure and the granting of tariffs, tax, and currency-related privileges facilitated the
utilization of labor in regions where—outside the limits of the free production zones—none
of the preconditions for profitable production were present apart from the labor force.
Through the free production zones, four important goals were named as being attainable:
creating new jobs and eliminating unemployment, creating a skilled industrial work force
and providing access to modem technology, increasing foreign exchange receipts, and
providing a wider scope for developing countries to conduct their foreign trade policies.
Further, UNIDO expounded a set of goals to be achieved through free production zones,
by combining several reasons:
a. a part of an overall industrial development program of the country or of a
certain region of the country;
b. a measure for solving the unemployment problem by the creation of new
labor opportunities;
c. stimulation of development of export-oriented industries to increase export
volume and foreign exchange receipts;
d. acquirement of modem industrial techniques from abroad through which the
leveling up of the domestic industrial standard may be achieved;




f. means of a concentrated and rational development of infrastructure with the
industrial free zone acting as an industrial pole.25
According to the ILO report, the employment policy pursued in the free production
zones and the world market factories was incapable of effecting a reduction of
unemployment within the free production zones.26 Experience and foreseeable trends
seemed to suggest that exported-oriented industrialization as it was developing in free
production zones and world market factories did not reduce the problems of
unemployment, untrained labor force, and lack of modern technology. With the exception
of a few countries in Southeast Asia, the creation of specific job opportunities in export-
oriented production could not be equated with a general reduction in unemployment.
Relationships between the advanced industrialized and Third World countries in
economic issues have always been fraught with stalemates and frustrations, as evidenced
by the trade relations between the Third World and the advanced industrial countries within
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) formed in 1948 in Torquay
(England). This frustration stemmed from the number of trade malpractices by GATT
which the Third World claimed hindered its economic development, relegating them to a
subordinate position within the world economic system; i.e., the Third World claimed that
the tariff structures of most developed countries institutionalized within GATT all worked
against its own economic development. As one author put it, "These cascading tariff
structures and other trade policies of advanced industrial states impose a particularly severe
barrier to goods that less developed countries are most capable of producing for export—
agricultural goods, semiprocessed commodities, and labor-intensive consumer goods."27
25Ibid., p. 7.
26ILO, Employment. Growth, and Basic Needs: A One-Word Problem (Geneva:
Springer, 1976), pp. 18-19.
27Harry Johnson, Economic Policies Toward Less Developed Countries
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1967), p. 56.
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Tariff rates were overall higher for more easily produced consumer goods shipped
to the Third World than for raw materials which the latter could export. Even when
alterations were made in trade relationships between the Third World and advanced
countries—such as the "Tokyo Round" on the GATT principle dealing with relaxation of
some tariff structures, the nondiscrimination and reciprocity method—such negotiations
always placed the Third World at a disadvantage by the necessity to offer rich states an
equivalent tariff reduction from the advanced countries. In support of the Third World on
this reciprocity bargaining negotiation on trade relations, the following statement was made:
The developing countries, of course, have had no bargaining power, politically
or economically. The rule of reciprocity has required them to give a matching
concession, but clearly they are not in a position to give any. Tariffs on
industrial products of interest to industrial nations have been gradually brought
down, those on products of interest to developing countries have remained at a
high level.28
The reality of this type of negotiations was one of inequality, because the call was
for equal competition among fundamentally unequal economic units. Such negotiations
always ended without positive achievements toward solving the Third World problem. In
fact, wider global negotiations on similar economic issues have always ended thus. For
example, the Cancun summit, whose objective was to open the way for global negotiation
on economic issues and particularly to persuade the United States to change its position of
free market as a prescription for Third World Development, to one of offering some basic
economic welfare to the world's suffering people so as to foster development, was also a
failure. According to Mortimer, "Cancun was a colossal flop. Rather, Reagan used
Cancun as an opportunity to reiterate his faith in the free market as an allocator of the global
28Blake and Walters, The Politics of Global Economic Relations, op. cit., p. 36.
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wealth."29 What Reagan gave the Third World at Cancun was his confidence in the
existing international agencies as the appropriate forum in discussing economic
development.
The final analysis was that the liberal trade and economic policies, as a means of
economic development, was not successfully challenged by the Third World countries.
The political appeal also diminished for such broader world negotiations as each country
positioned its relations in terms of trade and economic development so as to be conducive
to its own interests. The leadership of OPEC as a joint OPEC-Third World bargaining
platform with industrialized countries during the 1970s provided moderately successful in
challenging the existing liberal trade and economic policies that were unfavorable to the
Third World. However, this success eroded in the 1980s as OPEC became more impotent
as a bargaining power within the world economic system due to oil crises, the growing
world economic recession, and the differing ideological beliefs among Third World
countries in approaching economic development with the industrialized nations.
Nigeria in the Changing Division of Labor
The specific data analysis of the changing division of labor in the case of Nigeria,
and a focus on foreign investment in its manufacturing sector, will be presented in Chapter
III. Membership and states' relative positions in the world economic system determined
how the state was viewed internationally. Nigeria, thus, was a peripheral state in the
capitalist economy. Further, it could not divorce itself from the historical implications of
capitalism in Africa. As the largest populated country in Africa, rich in minerals as well as
raw materials, its position as an economic interest for capitalist exploitation made it even
164.
29Mortimer, The Third World Coalition in International Politics, op. cit., pp. 163-
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more vulnerable for further exploitation; however, the control of the rich economic
endowment of Nigeria caused a problem.
Using Africa as an Example, Ake stated that, "At independence, there was clearly a
state of disequilibrium because national leadership had just captured political office while
economic control of the economy still remains in the hands of the Western Capital."30
What was happening there was quite different from the capitalist system. The historical
flourishing of capitalism was founded on its success in translating its economic power into
political control. On the other hand, most African leaders used political power to control
the economic power of the state. This might well be the reason for the many coups as well
as the political and economic instability. Lacking an adequate economic base, they became
permanently cast into the dependency situation. Thus, at the global level, Nigeria was a
raw material producers like the rest of the African states after independence. Samir Amin
threw more light on this. "Western capitalism during and after the so-called political
independence cast African nations into permanent producers of raw materials with the sole
purpose of satisfying the economic demands of the metropolis, leaving each colonial
economy to be characterized and dominated by one primary product. "31 The major
spokesperson on this classical division of labor put it this way: "Thus, the international
division of labor bequeathed a legacy of raw material production and export to the colonies
without any infrastructural base for processing them. The concomitant result was that the
colonies produced what they did not consume and consumed what they did not produce. "32
30Claude Ake, A Political Economy of Africa (New York: Longman, 1981), p.
140.
3ilbid., p. 201.
32Alex Danso, "The Causes and Impact of the African Debt Crisis," Review of
Black Political Economy. 1990, vol. 19, no. 1, p. 5.
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It can thus be seen that the subordinate position of Nigeria as of its independence
affected its relationship to the world economy and its tendency toward NIDL. To
understand fully the position of Nigeria in the world economy, its past in the world
economy must be studied. Nigerian economic development can be divided into four
phases.33 The precolonial and early colonial periods were characterized by economic
stagnation, followed in the first three decades of the twentieth century by pronounced
economic expansion. However, this was interrupted by the world economic crisis of
World War II (see Table 2, p. 32). This period of downswing and economic stagnation
caused by exogenous factors between 1929 and 1945 was succeeded by renewed economic
expansion in the following two decades, which came to a temporary halt during the
Nigerian civil war of July 1966 to January 1970. The oil boom of the 1970s attracted
foreign investment to Nigeria and, despite its sluggish economic recession of the 1980s to
the present, its oil production, raw material, and manpower availability remained the focus
point of capitalist investment.
Economic activity during the precolonial and early colonial period was largely
restricted to the production of subsistence crops or goods for local consumption. The
methods utilized were primitive and, despite some trade connections with North Africa via
northern Nigeria, West Africa through western Nigeria, and East Africa through the
neighboring country of eastern Nigeria, Cameroon. The interregional and international
exchange was unimportant. Unrestricted slave trading provided the most significant and
tragic connection with the outside world from the sixteenth to the beginning of the
nineteenth century. Increasing imperial European influence—mainly from Great Britain—
transformed the economic, political, and social structure of Nigeria. The first three decades
33G. K. Helleiner, Peasant Agriculture. Government, and Economic Growth in
Nigeria (Homewood, IL: Richard D. Irwin, 1966), p.l9.
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of the twentieth century saw an economic growth which was primarily stimulated by
agricultural exports. A distinct regional division of labor specialization became noticeable
in the production areas of ground nuts and cotton in the North, cocoa and palm kernels in
the West, palm oil and palm kernels in the East. The exportation of these agriculture
products could not be completed without an investment infrastructure. The two entities
responsible for this were the Royal Niger Company and the British Colonial government.
They were the first to invest in the exportation of these products, and hence stimulated
economic expansion. The colonies of the Lagos protectorate were placed under British rule
in 1861, and the protectorates of southern and northern Nigeria in 1900.
The present Nigeria resulted from the infusion of these three protectorates in
1914.34 Was Nigeria ripe enough to be integrated into the world economy at that time?
Obviously, the answer was yes. Their products were in great demand in the world market.
However, certain preconditions had to prevail so that the capital would be rightly invested
in the capitalist mode of production: cheap labor, minimal skills, transportation, and
communication. The first two variables were very much available. Labor was cheap, as
Nigerians had never been exposed to the capitalist market. They already knew how to plant
and harvest the products, and thus needed no training by the investors. The third issue
concerned the way to extract these products from the hinterland to the sea ports so they
could be shipped overseas. Traffic development, especially railway construction, was an
important prerequisite for progressive development of the export sector. Construction on
the first railway line began in 1898 in Lagos; in 1901 in Ibadan, the center of the cocoa¬
growing area, and in 1911 in Kano which lay at the center of the groundnut region. A
34B. Onimode, Imperialism and Underdevelopment in Nigeria (London: Zed
Press, 1982), p. 35.
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second railway line linking Port Harcourt with the coal mines of Enugu in 1916 was
extended to Kaduna after World War L
The growth of agricultural production for export did not result from a reduction in
production of goods for domestic competition. Rather, it came from the increased
employment of the previously unused production factors of land and labor.35 According to
Shatzl, the price offered by foreign trading companies for agricultural products sold on the
world market, as well as the accompanying demand for imported goods stimulated in the
indigenous population by those companies, caused the peasant farmers to substitute leisure
for work.36 Most populations affected by this subsistence on export products were those
within the traffic flow of the export line products.
The period of economic growth was suddenly interrupted in 1929. The collapse of
international trade during the world economic crisis led to a drastic reduction in Nigerian
exports. A renewed expansion of exports, noticeable in the mid- 1930s, came to a halt with
World War n.37 The long period of stagnation of World War 11 was succeeded by steady
economic growth, which was interrupted by Nigeria's civil war. Economic indicators
point toward a continuous growth during the early 1970s due to the oil boom, but this
domestic growth could not withstand the external world's economic stagnation and the con¬
tinuous devaluation of the Nigerian currency in the world market. The drive for capitalist
expansion and the tendency toward NIDL was manifested by many factors in Nigeria:
The downturn of the world economic recession since the late 1960s.... This
is necessary because capital must find a place to further sustain its expansion.
There are abundant mineral resources that will guarantee capitalist exploitation.
Import substitution, even when manufactured in Nigeria, can generate and add
35Ibid., p. 16.
36Ludwig Shatzl, Industrialization in Nigeria (Munich, Germany: Welt Forum
Verlag, 1973), p. 30.
37Ibid., p. 17.
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to the world market expansion. The internationalization and intensification of
competition also emitted strong impulses for capitalist investment in Nigeria.
Britain and other trading companies invested in the industrial sector in order to
stabilize their market position as the world economy staggers. Again, those
foreign producers which had not established themselves led to the installation of
manufacturing opportunity to gain a foothold in the expanding Nigerian
market.38
Nigeria also possessed the largest market in tropical Africa.
Economic policies at the federal level were relatively liberal and even regional
levels intensified the tendency for this development as each region offered the
best production for any incoming investor. A whole series of fiscal incentives
also attracted the investors. The most important instruments to stimulate
investment are held to be the temporary exemption from income tax for
enterprises which are accorded pioneer status, generous depreciation rates, and
a great variety of tariff concession.39
The post-independence administration in Nigeria, under the capitalist ideology,
perceived industrialization—as in other Third World countries—as a major opportunity to
increase the rate of economic growth, raise the population's standard of living, create jobs,
reduce import of manufactured goods, and decrease the trade deficits resulting from such
imports. However, if the tendency toward NIDL in Nigeria was tailored by the capitalist
investors so that domestic production of manufactured goods was patterned upon past
imports of industrial products, then the strategy adopted to attract industrialization by the
neocolonialist leaders of Nigeria was nothing short of import substitution, and in no way
accelerated developmental growth. It can thus be seen that import substitution was a
developmental tendency toward NIDL. The argument fits the capitalist ideology that, if
local consumption of a country can serve the interests of neighboring countries, then it
would be economically justified if industry were moved closer to the point of
consumption—from the center to the periphery. So, in Nigeria as well as in other areas of
38p. Kilby, Industrialization in an Open Economy—Nigeria: 1945-66 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1967), p. 54.
39Shatzl, Industrialization in Nigeria, op. cit., p. 30.
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Africa which have the resources for this capitalist drive, import substitution led to this
tendency toward NIDL. "Import substitution is not only the industrialization strategy
which is most frequently observed in the developing countries; it presumably also
represents the only means of getting industrialization started. "40
The emergence of this phase of industrialization manifested itself strangely after
Nigeria gained independence. It became one of the critical bourgeois indices of
modernization upon which to face the demand of the colonial masters who handed over
government to them after independence. The insertion of the governing elite into the state
apparatus linked the bourgeoisie to the center on an international plane.
The presence of MNC in Nigeria was in the form of three types of investment. The
most obvious was "market development" investment to maintain and expand markets
previously secured by exports during the "classical division of labor."4i Such investment
occurred in consumer goods industries, which corresponded both with the product lines of
previous exports and with the highly protected industries being promoted under the NIDL
by the client states. The British-formed United African Company (UAC) led this process
in Nigeria. The British hegemony of this industrial sector could not be doubted, since it
was the former imperial master of Nigeria. Another aspect was export-oriented investment
to secure the supply of critical raw materials needed in the industrialized countries. This
was also historical in tone, as it explained why foreign capital dominated such sectors as
mining, petroleum, and other extractive mineral resources.
Since independence in 1960, tariff policies were manipulated by successive
governments to encourage consumer products manufactured in Nigeria, and protect young
40lbid., p. 179.
41L. C. Gardner, Economic Aspects of New Deal Diplomacy (Madison: University
of Wisconsin, 1964), p. 10.
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Nigerian industries from foreign giant industrial competitors. During the 1972-76
indigenization period, when aliens were banned from several areas of manufacturing
industry, the aim was to protect the young industries so as to satisfy domestic consumer
goods needs, which meant a replacement of the classical division of labor by the new
domestic division of labor. Another manifestation of protecting young industries was the
wholesale ban on several imports, and the imposition of licensing for several others in
1978 following the sudden depletion of oil revenues.42 Concentrating on consumer goods
manufacturing, a new domestic division of labor in this instance raised a number of typical
problems in Nigeria. First, the rising domestic demand for industrial imports reduced
export volume and export proceeds. In turn, this reduced the possibility of transferring
domestic savings into capital goods manufacturing, and resulted in increased need for
foreign capital. The expected foreign exchange savings from consumer manufacturing
products failed to materialize, and only marginal changes occurred in the import structure.
The World Bank put it this way:
The foreign exchange situation was so serious that in 1970, Nigeria had barely
US$222 million in gross external reserve, while the country's current account
balance before interest payments on external public debt stood at deficits of
US$348 million in 1970 and US$511 million in 1976, despite the oil boom.43
The combined effects of these shortcomings led to the domination of consumer
manufactured goods by the MNC, and this sustained and intensified the tendency toward
NIDL and Nigeria's technological dependence on the imperialists. In the face of these
problems, export diversification and export industrialization was canvassed as an
alternative to domestic consumer manufacturing. If one defends this alternative as a more
420nimode, Imperialism and Underdevelopment in Nigeria, op. cit., p. 181.
43World Bank, World Development Report (Washington, DC: World Bank Press,
1988), p. 92.
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viable means toward industrialization, then one would align oneself to the antagonist of
domestic consumer manufacturing industries:
The present position of import substitution industries offers no possibility of
transforming the traditional import substitution industries into export industries
for high qudity and durable consumption and investment goods which would
have a chance of being saleable in the industrialized countries.^
While export-oriented strategies might be the order of the day for Nigeria's
developmental policies, the prospects for major growth in the manufacturing and
processing of durable capital goods should not be overestimated. No one can easily give
his might to save others.
Most African manufacturing is of light consumer goods, such as beverages for
the home markets, or first- and second-stage processing of Africa’s primary
produce in rudimentary installations such as ginneries for cotton mills, for
groundnut or palm oil, sawntills for timber, and tanneries for leather. There is
little or no advanced technology production of manufactured goods for export
such as that which comes from rapidly growing industries of Southeast Asia.
In short, African industrialization to date has largely been import substitution
oriented, not export oriented.45
In general, all African countries' industrialization was completely patterned by the
MNC structure. It had no independent self-sustained power to uplift itself to manufacture
those goods that could compete favorably on the global level. African manufacturing was
tailored only to meet relevant African needs, and available to only a few. "Production
ranges from Coca-Cola for the satisfaction of thirst to Mercedes cars for the satisfaction of
transportation needs."46
The tendency toward NIDL in Nigeria served at best to create domestic consumer
manufacturing products plants which in no way produced goods competitive with those of
the MNC. These import substitution industries (ISI) could not guarantee Nigeria's
440nimode, Imperialism and Underdevelopment in Nigeria, op. cit., p. 182.
45Higgott, "Africa and the NIDL," op. cit., p. 294.
46lbid., 296.
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comparativeness on a global level. As stated earlier, Nigeria was inevitably incorporated
within the global economy in a subordinate manner. The possible outcome was manifested
in its ongoing transformation. Even though the defenders of ISI industrialization had
argued that the problem was not with the strategy but its implementation, it is necessary at
this point to highlight the basic problems inherent in Nigeria's situation. First, these ISI
were protected since independence and tended to remain perpetual infant industries, thereby
being chronically noncompetitive and needing constant government assistance to keep them
in operation. What good is a business venture that fails to sustain itself? Capital ideology
is based on the multiplication factor of reinvestment of profit, or it will lose its profit¬
making ability. Second, the product structure of these ISI typically involved the wrong
products from the viewpoints of the priorities of basic needs of nutrition, clothing, shelter,
and health.47 The ISI producing these domestic consumer products were tailored to the
imported but wrong imperialist consumption habits cultivated for global distribution.
A third and major point was the domination of domestic consumption products by
foreign monopoly capital, causing a clash of interests between the domestic consumption
producing country and the MNC. Nigeria's eagerness to industrialize lay more in such
areas as profit reinvestment, transfer of technology, new industries—especially in heavy
capital good productions, based on local inputs, employment creation, and satisfaction with
products—for it to move ahead in the direction of industrialization. However, the global
strategy of MNC dictated a contradictory and opposing interest to that of the host nation,
such as surplus transfer, technological dominance, higher expatriate quotas, quick and high
profits with less risk, and export of primary products rather than industrial manufacturing
from Nigeria. The strengths of the government in input possessions, the size of its
47UNCTAD,"Technological Dependence: Its Nature, Consequences, and Policy
Implications," Africa Development. 1977, vol. 2, no. 2, p. 23.
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domestic market, and its favorable investment climate, were confronted with the MNCs'
capital sizes, technological and organizational superiority, market power, investment
dispersal, and political support of their home governments. In all, Nigeria always lost in
the confrontation. Despite indigenization decrees in the country, the MNC continued to
dominate, and were even pursued by the various state governments for them to invest their
capital in. their own respective state. The area of technology was another problem. If the
application of the NIDL was to relocate industries to areas that would enhance capitalist
accumulation of profits, then the technology to be employed had to accompany it. There is
no yardstick to measure this issue in this research; thus, no detailed analysis is made
because the survey questionnaire (see Appendix) did not address this issue. The only
measure that the researcher employed to determine the nature of technology transfer was to
question the type of training provided by MNC to Nigerian employees working in their
company, and compare them with similar industrial sectors of the indigenous enterprises
(see Chapter IV). There were many negative comments on technology transfer to the
recipient country. To some respondents, technology transfer by MNC was a myth.
. . . [Tjhe developing countries, with some 70% of the world's population
accounting for only 30% of the world higher education, 5% of expenditure on
research and development, and 1% of ownership of patents. It is this, in the
field of science technology,where one of the most extreme manifestations of
underdevelopment is exhibited. Many of the international initiatives undertaken
. . . and much of the science and technology programming undertaken in the
Third World countries, appear to be based on the notion that a mere mechanical
"transfer of technology," from the developed to the developing world, will
result in the desired contribution of science and technology to the development
process Latin America and the rest of the developing world appear trapped
in Phase I [of technological importation]. . . . Research and development
institutes that are established are not used by local industries; they, too, in time
become marginalized.... Such experiences suggest that policies of this kind
speak to the symptoms, rather than the underlying causes of the condition of
technological dependence.
48N. Girvan, "Technological Dependence: Its Nature, Consequences, and Policy
Implications," African Development. 1977, vol. 2, no. 2, p. 3.
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There is no doubt that foreign investment by MNC was the original strategy
supposed to achieve this technological transfer. However, since the MNC were unwilling
to employ nationals in their projects, the Nigerian government added joint ventures
involving foreign technical partners in the foreign investment packages. The Third
National Development Plan, in its industrial policy, thus aimed at the transfer of industrial
technology, requiring the indigenization of technology.49 The problem of technological
indigenization was the extent to which it integrated Nigerian know-how into that of the
capitalist manufacturing equipment. Could Nigerians be exposed in this developmental
process? Those were the questions that needed to be addressed. The exposure of
Nigerians to these advanced technologies determined how much ownership they had in the
enterprise. The mere partnership did not guarantee in any way the skills needed to become
a part of that venture. "Such joint ventures usually involve employing Nigerian engineers
and other technical staff, either for glorified administrative duties or for routine operations,
since the expatriates are given full control over technical operations. "50 Nigerians had to be
trained to take over full operational management of joint projects. Whether this could be
obtained by diplomacy, dialogue, or sacrifice is yet to be seen. But the reality was that no
technology had yet been transferred, where Nigerian laborers were employed to do manual
labor, or engineers assigned to unskilled work that did not in a way promote their training
knowledge. Attendant to this paradox was the fact that the imported technology was
capital-intensive relative to the Nigerian labor abundance. The reality was that feasible
labor-intensive technologies that could be utilized did exist, but unrealistic relative prices of
labor and capital—among other factors—^precluded their utilization. It can thus be seen that
49N. Tugenhat, "Technology: A New White Magic for Africa," African
Development. 1977. vol. 2, no. 2, p. 11.
soOnimode, Imperialism and Underdevelopment in Nigeria, op. cit., p. 154.
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numerous problems faced Nigeria in its incorporation within NIDL. Among them were the
imported consumption technology and the domination by MNC, which operated and
rendered the transfer of technology meaningless. Nigeria had neither the means nor the
solution to face the problem of "technical knowhow." Why were the Nigerian raw
materials unable to compete on the same footing as the dictates and possessions of the
capitalists' money and technology? The answer was simple. Nigeria was westernized not
to do without the basic necessities of western life, and as such had to depend on the import
of manufactured consumer goods, foreign production, control of the machinery specific to
foreign factor-proportions, foreign domination of technological knowledge and production
techniques, significant foreign control over domestic technological choices and initiative—
from science education to research and development—as well as neocolonial trade bondage
operating through trademarks, patents, royalties, and technological imports.
Those are the principal reasons why technological dependence persisted in Nigeria.
In short, foreign domination of manufacturing and product groups also meant that the so-
called indigenization of industrial technology was difficult, because it is impossible to
manipulate what cannot be controlled. Foreign investors knew only too well that their
technological superiority was the decisive variable factor, and they would not surrender it at
any market price—^unless perhaps at greater sacrifice.
This chapter has described the development and the manifestation of capitalism as a
means of economic production in the world economic system. The survival of this
economic production activity is historical in nature, and carries with it an inherited crisis
that has divided the world into two—the developed and the underdeveloped countries, the
rich and the poor, the haves and the have-nots. As it divides, it seeks new areas where
investment will yield more profit, leading toward the tendency for NIDL into which Nigeria
was inevitably drawn.
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Chapter III discusses the operation of foreign investment in the manufacturing
sector of the Nigerian economy as evidence of this tendency toward NIDL. A detailed
analysis of this development is provided.
CHAPTER III
FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE MANUFACTURING
SECTOR OF THE NIGERIAN ECONOMY
The aim of this Chapter was to take the sample data and test the hypothesis that
industries did not encourage the export of manufacturing of export products to stimulate the
acquisition of much-needed hard currency. To test this hypothesis, the researcher analyzed
the pattern and growth of foreign industrial ventures in the manufacturing sector of the
Nigerian economy through the use of the sample data acquired by means of a questionnaire
(Appendix). The presence of these foreign industrial investments in the manufacturing
sector of the Nigerian economy was unmistakable evidence of the tendency toward NIDL.
This study has used the following definitions:
1. Number employed: employees regularly on the payroll of the company.
2. Wages and salaries: gross earnings of employees before deductions and income
tax; bonuses, overtime payments, and allowances.
3. Value of sales: value of the proportion of goods produced by companies and
actually sold during the survey year.
The research areas described in this chapter covered two main topics. The first
comprised the nature of legal conduct of operating business in Nigeria by foreign
companies, the growth and concentration of foreign private investments in Nigeria’s
economy, and the structure and distribution of investment in the manufacturing sector. The
second focused on data presentation on the nature and type of manufacturing investment
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and its contribution to the Nigerian economy in terms of whether or not the investments
were directed toward industries for export-oriented products that could generate much-
needed foreign exchange, and the ownership characteristics of these industrial ventures.
The new tendency in the division of labor was the necessary outcome of the
development of the world economy. It posed the rearrangement of the traditional partition
of the world as it developed under the dominance of the capitalist mode of production, with
essentially a small number of industrial countries on the one hand, and a large number of
developing countries producing raw materials and labor for the world market on the other
hand—and into which Nigeria was inevitably incorporated.
Legal and Socioeconomic Aspects
of Investment in Nigeria
Two major policies were employed in developing countries to effect indigenous
ownership and control of domestic industries: nationalization and indigenization.i
Nationalization involved government acquisition in whole or in part of the share capital.2
This did not necessarily imply indigenous control over the operations of the enterprise. On
the other hand, indigenization compelled foreign investors to divest some or all of their
shareholdings in certain economic ventures to allow shareholdings to be bought in
accordance with specified procedures by indigenous individual associations as well as by
governments. There were very few cases of nationalization in Nigeria. Much greater
reliance was placed on indigenization of foreign enterprises for three reasons. First, the
funds needed for nationalization of foreign enterprises had a very high opportunity cost and
could better be expended for other developmental programs in both the social and the
1 Richard Robinson, International Business Policy (Cambridge: Hamlin
Publications, 1973), p. 6.
2Federal Ministry of Economic Development, Second National Development Plan.
1970-74 (Lagos: Government Printing Office, 1970), p. 37.
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physical infrastructure. Second, there was the fear of antagonizing foreign investors to the
point of starving the country of much-needed capital goods and technical skills. Third, the
overt commitment of the Nigerian government to a free enterprise system was incompatible
with nationalization. Consequently, Nigeria had issued repeated assurances that foreign
enterprises in Nigeria would not be nationalized.^
The objectives of Nigeria's indigenization policy were political as well as economic.
They were meant to provide to Nigerian citizens the inalienable opportunity to enjoy more
fully the economic benefits derived not only from their toil but also from all the resources
exploited by them or anyone else within the geographical boundary of the country, and
complement the country's political independence with economic independence.
Furthermore, the government wanted to compel foreign investors to move away from the
establishment of light industries, toward the establishment of heavy industries. This would
effect a more appropriate transfer of technology from the industrialized nations to the
Federal Republic of Nigeria. The overall premise was that an economy dominated by
foreign interests lacked the sting to act in the best interests of its citizens in both domestic
and international affairs.^
The Nigerian Companies Act of 1968 provided for the establishment of private and
public limited liability companies. A private limited liability company, unlike a public one,
was not obliged to publish its income statements and balance sheets for each operating
year. Only the shareholders of a private company could be informed of the financial status
of the company. This was one reason why a survey was carried out for this study.
3J. F. Rweyemamu, Industrialization and Income Distribution in Africa:
CODFSRIA (Dakar, Senegal: Codesria, 1980), pp. 168-190.
4Ibid., p. 168.
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The Indigenization Act of 1977 modified an earlier 1972 Act of the same title.5
This Act classified the business operations of Nigeria into three schedules. Business
falling under Schedule I were mainly services and distribution, which had to be wholly
owned by Nigerians.^ Businesses falling under Schedule II had to be owned jointly with
foreigners.^ The Nigerian ownership in the latter had to be at least 60 percent, and the
foreign partners could not own more than 40 percent of the business equity. The
businesses in Schedule III had to be 40 percent Nigerian and 60 percent foreign.®
The Growth and Concentration of Foreign
Investment in Nigeria
The case for industrialization in a developing country is based on the premise that
industrialization helps increase national income, stabilizes foreign exchange earnings by
diversifying exports, promotes import substitution, and provides productive employment.
A brief overview of this trend helps explain the Nigerian situation. Table 3 shows the
exports of merchandise for various country groups in 1965 and 1982. In the former year,
primary commodities accounted for 76, 84, and 99 percent of the merchandise of low,
middle, and high income oil-exporting economies, respectively, as compared with 30
percent for a share of such commodities in the export of industrial market economies.
SFederal Republic of Nigeria, First National Development Plan. 1962-68 (Lagos:
Government Printing Office, 1961), pp. 21-24; Federal Ministry of Information,
Parliamentary Debates (Lagos: Government Printing Office, March 2, 1964).
















economies 76 24 50 50
Middle income
economies 84 17 58 42
High income
economies 99 1 96 2
Industrial market
economies 30 70 26 73
East European non-
market economies NA NA NA NA
NA = Not available.
Source: World Development Report. Washington, DC: World Bank Press, 1985.
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While manufacturers constituted 70 percent of the exports of the industrial market
economies for the period under review, they accounted for only 24, 17, and 1 percent,
respectively, of the merchandise exports of the low, middle, and high income oil exporting
economies. Table 3 also indicates that, while in 1982 the merchandise exports of the
industrialized economies were still dominated by manufacturing products, and those of
high income oil exporters by primary commodities, the export base of the low and middle
income economies had become more diversified—with manufacturers constituting a much
larger proportion of merchandise exports compared with 1965. This new development
highlighted the changes due to the tendency toward NIDL. The significant export changes
of manufactured products in the low income countries reflected that something had to be
responsible for this situation.
Table 4 shows the share of developing countries as a group in the exports of
manufacturers. The bulk of growth occurred in few countries within the group, notably
TABLE4





Developing Countries 7.3 9.9 17.4
Low income economies 2.3 1.8 2.1
Middle income economies 5.0 8.1 15.3
High income oil exporters 0.2 0.1 0.3
Industrial market economies 92.5 90.0 82.3
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: World Development Report. Washington, DC: World Bank Press, 1987.
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Hong Kong, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, Brazil, India, and Mexico. For the
majority of developing countries, there was no significant change in the post-war period in
the pattern and structure of exports. Primary commodities remained the dominant
merchandise. For example, in low income African countries, agricultural commodities
contributed 70.7 percent of total merchandise exports in 1964-66, and still accounted for as
much as 68.4 percent of exports in 1982-84. However, beyond justifying
industrialization, a country must decide whether industrial enterprises should be mainly the
responsibility of the private sector, of the government, or of both. Nigeria chose the mixed
economy option, with the government encouraging the growth of the private sector and
participating directly in industrial undertakings where necessary. Unfortunately, this
participation was a serious economic decision and undertaking because of exogenous
factors. Primarily, the dictates of the global economy are based on macroeconomic policies
and developments of industrialized countries. The participation of Nigeria, and indeed
most developing countries, in the world economy has been based on production and export
of primary products in exchange for manufactured goods—the classical division of labor.
However, the developed world manufactures and purchases the primary raw materials.
The growth and concentration of foreign investment in Nigeria was transient and
commercial in nature at its beginning. The Industrial Revolution of the second half of the
nineteenth century created the necessity for capital to reside in the foreign country, first in
the form of extractive industrial investment to satisfy Europe's progressing
industrialization, and then in the entire relocation of manufacturing industries—in this case
in Nigeria—when this capital could no longer guarantee investors' profits in Europe. This
new development intensified the tendency for NIDL in Nigeria and represented the
beginning of foreign direct investment, which is still predominantly trade-oriented and—in
a larger area—^represents production for domestic consumption in Nigeria. As shown in
Tables 5 and 6, the earliest foreign investments in Nigeria were predominantly British and
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trade-oriented. On the average, 69 percent of all non-mining firms existing in the years
1921, 1929, 1933, and 1936, were British. The figure is even as high as 94 percent in
1921. The reason for this pattern was obvious. Britain was the colonial power of Nigeria,
and thus monopolized trade relationships. Similarly, 85 percent of foreign firms existing in
Nigeria in 1927 engaged exclusively in trade, and only 5 percent engaged exclusively in
manufacturing.
What might be regarded as the beginning of the presence of MNC in Nigeria
manifested itself primarily in the post-independence years (1960) to the present. The
Nigerian government gave serious thought to implementing indigenous control of the major
sectors of the economy. The enthusiasm for encouraging private indigenous enterprises
stemmed from the resentment of a foreign-dominated economy inherited at independence,
and the contention that private indigenous enterprises were more likely to operate in the
national interest than foreign businesses. Table 7 shows that, ten years after independence
but before the Indigenization Decree, Nigeria's economy was still dominated by foreign
interests. The table also shows that, except in the category of £1,000-5,0009 paid up
capital, the number of firms in which Nigerians have majority shareholdings are much
fewer than those in which foreigners have majority shareholdings. This disparity tends to
be larger than the size of the firm. Nigerians had majority shareholdings in 34.3 percent of
firms in 1970, while the figure for foreigners was 65.7 percent. Perhaps more revealing of
the economic impact than the growth of the magnitude of foreign investments are the
changes in the sectoral composition. Table 8 shows that, in 1973, mining and quarrying
accounted for 52.5 percent of foreign investments, with manufacturing and processing
following with 23.2 percent. Trading and the business services sector held about 16.7
percent of total foreign investments.
9£ = pounds sterling.
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TABLES
NATIONALirmS OF PRINCIPAL INDEPENDENT




British 94 64 40 38
Anglo-American 1 1 1 1
Anglo-French 1 - - -
Anglo-Greek 2 3 3 3
Anglo-Italian 1 1 1 1
Total British 99 69 45 43
American 1
Czechoslovakian - 1 1 1
Dutch - 2 1 1
Dutch-German - - 1 3
French 3 8 9 8
German - 10 14 16
Greek - - 3 1
Italian - - 2 4
Indian - - 2 2
Levantine - - 1 2
Norwegian - - 1 1
Swiss 2 1
Source: J. Mars, "Extraterritorial Enterprises," quoted in Margery Perham (ed.), The
Economics of Tropical Dependency (London: Faber and Faber, 1947), vol. 2, p. 49.
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TABLE 6




Trade only 88 59 48 46
Tin mining NA 70 47 39
Plantation and trade 1 8 10 12
Shipping and trade 1 1 2 2
Plantation, manufacturing, shipping, trade - - 1 1
Manufacturing and trade 2 2 2 2
Shipping only 1 9 9 8
Manufacturing only 5 6 6 7
Banking and insurance 2 5 4 4
Professions 2 1 1 1
Total: 102 161 130 122
Source: J. Mars, "Extraterritorial Enterprises," quoted in Margery Perham (ed.), The
Economics of Tropical Dependency (London: Faber and Faber, 1947), vol. 2, pp. 20-21.
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TABLET
DISTRIBUTION OF MAJORITY SHAREHOLDING BY







Under 1,000 157 212 369 42.6 57.4 100
1,000-5,000 110 105 215 51.1 48.9 100
5,001-10,000 42 112 154 27.3 72.7 100
10,001-20.000 31 64 95 32.6 67.4 100
20,001-50,000 27 113 140 19.3 80.7 100
50,001-100,000 11 59 70 15.7 84.3 100
Over 100,000 409 783 1,192 34.3 65.7 100
NIS = Nigerian individual, government, and paragovernmental institutions.
EIS = Expatriate individuals and institutions.
Source: Adapted from O. Teriba, et al., "Some Aspects of Ownership and Control
Structure: Business Enterprises in Developing Economy—The Nigerian Case," Nigerian
Journal of Economic and Social Studies. 1972,14, 1, p. 78.
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TABLES
CUMULATIVE FOREIGN PRIVATE INVESTMENT
IN NIGERIA BY INDUSTRIAL SECTOR (in NIOOO)
1970 1971 1972 1973
Agriculture, forestry, and fishing 11.2 15.5 9.4 7.9
Building and construction 13.8 15.4 34.3 45.3
Manufacturing and processing 224.8 378.8 356.6 409.0
Mining and quarrying 515.4 694.0 859.7 925.3
Trading and business services 206.6 187.2 242.7 294.7
Transport and communication 13.8 12.0 12.2 11.6
Miscellaneous 17.6 20.0 56.2 70.2
Total . 1,003.2 1,322.2 1,571.1 1,763.7
1974 1975 1976 1977
Agriculmre, forestry, and fishing 20.7 20.1 21.9 75.0
Building and construction 60.2 120.7 122.5 121.4
Manufacturing and processing 520.4 548.1 550.7 703.8
Mining and quarrying 818.1 959.6 918.9 1,090.8
Trading and business services 321.3 611.8 624.8 365.5
Transport and communication 21.9 24.1 11.0 30.6
Miscellaneous 45.5 99.3 84.0 144.3
Total . 1,812.1 2,285.1 2,333.8 2,531.4
1978 1979 1980 1981
Agriculture, forestry, and fishing 117.6 120.8 120.8 120.5
Building and construction 224.3 294.3 307.8 255.9
Manufacturing and processing 1,263.4 1,402.3 1,503.9 1,705.7
Mining and quarrying 421.3 466.8 677.4 526.0
Trading and business services 522.5 550.5 693.2 767.2
Transport and communication 55.6 60.5 62.2 60.8
Miscellaneous 258.5 257.7 255.1 251.8
Total . 2,863.2 3,153.1 3,620.1 3,757.9
1982 1983 1984 1985
Agriculture, forestry, and fishing 120.5 127.8 128.5 126.0
Building and constmction 422.5 443.9 429.0 453.2
Manufacturing and processing 1,922.5 2,128.1 2,109.3 2,288.1
Mining and quarrying 974.0 511.2 702.8 744.0
Trading and business services 1,483.6 2,274.0 2,622.5 2,697.9
Transport and communication 68.9 77.0 80.6 85.0
Miscellaneous 390.8 386.3 401.6 418.0
Total . 5,382.8 5,949.5 6,484.3 6,814.0
Source: Central Bank of Nigeria, Statistical Bulletin, December 1990, Table 5.4, pp.
131-132.
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Foreign investments in agriculture rose from N20.7 million in 1974 to N 126.0
million in 1985. Table 8 also shows that, in the period 1977-81, manufacturing dominated
other sectors by about 50 percent in overall industrial activities in Nigeria. Similarly, for
1982-85, manufacturing and building construction showed a 70 percent combined average,
with an average of 34 and 36 percent for the two industries, respectively. This is why
manufacturing was so important to this study as a crucial sector of the Nigerian economy.
Another aspect of foreign direct investment (FDI) is the change in the country of
origin. As seen in Table 5 above, in relation to the colonial period, the United Kingdom
continued to constitute the major sources of foreign investment in Nigeria. In 1970 (Table
9), it accounted for 40 percent of cumulative FDI. This dominant position was reduced by
1975, when the United Kingdom accounted for 38.8 percent. While the contribution of
western Europe (excluding the United Kingdom) remained relatively stable, the position of
the United States declined from 23.6 to 17.5 percent in the same period. Further analysis
of Table 9 reveals the continued domination of the United Kingdom in the Nigerian
economy as a private investors in the period 1975-85. It then accounted for about 40
percent of overall foreign investments, leaving the Europeans in second position with about
28 percent, and the United States a distant third with about 15 percent. Despite repeated
changes in government leadership, each administration has seen foreign investment as an
economic opportunity for Nigerian growth. The country should, thus, be conscious that
foreign capital is not a gift but also involves a cost to the economy in the form of profit




TOTAL AND PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION
OF CUMULATIVE FDI BY ORIGIN (N million)
Year FDI U.K. U.S. Other West
Europeans
Other
1970 1,003.2 44.0 22.9 22.4 10.4
1971 1,322.8 44.8 25.5 19.7 10.0
1972 1,571.1 49.0 18.2 23.4 9.4
1973 1,763.7 48.8 17.5 23.5 10.2
1974 1,812.1 46.0 17.0 25.0 12.0
1975 2,287.5 38.0 22.0 26.0 14.0
1976 2,333.8 40.4 16.1 28.0 15.5
1977 2,531.4 42.4 11.3 29.2 17.1
1978 2,863.2 41.7 12.0 29.6 16.7
1979 3,153.1 35.09 17.9 31.0 16.1
1980 3,620.1 39.3 15.6 30.6 14.5
1981 3,757.9 38.0 11.7 35.9 14.4
1982 5,382.8 37.0 21.8 28.9 12.3
1983 5,947.5 43.8 16.3 28.3 11.5
1984 6,484.3 48.0 14.9 25.6 11.6
1985 6,814.0 52.7 12.8 23.5 11.0
Source: Central Bank of Nigeria, Statistical Bulletin, December 1990, Table D5.3, p.
129.
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Structure and Distribution of Investment in the
Manufacturing Sector by Foreign Companies
A further breakdown in the cumulative investment in the manufacturing and
processing sector by type of industry is shown in Table 10, which provides data on
investment of assets in the manufacturing sector as well as by type of industry. The
cumulative foreign private investment in the manufacturing and processing sector was
N377.9 million in 1971.
In 1972, the level of investment declined by 5.9 percent to N357.6 million but
increased by 14.7 percent in 1973 to N407.1 million. The increase recorded for 1973 was
shared by all 20 industrial subgroups, except for the transport equipment industries where a
decline was recorded in 1974, when investment in this sector showed a decline of 29.8
percent from the 1973 level.
The 1974 decline affected most industrial subsectors but was more marked in food,
beverages, furniture and fixtures, paper and paper products, rubber products, and transport
equipment industries. The footwear and wearing apparels, leather products, basic metal
and metal products industries, recorded some increases ranging from 6.9 percent for basic
metals to 93.7 percent for footwear and apparel.
However, overall industrial investment in the manufacturing sector was dominated
by the following subsectors from 1975 to 1985: textile, chemical products, non-metal
mineral products, beverages, and tobacco. This was in line with the fourth hypothesis that
industrial investments were only in light consumer domestic goods which cannot generate
foreign hard currency. It also showed that export-oriented industrialization in many
developing countries was concentrated in textiles and chemical products.
Table 10 shows the concentration of these establishments by industrial location.




FOREIGN PRIVATE INVESTMENT IN THE MANUFACTURING
SECTOR ANALYZED BY TYPE OF INDUSTRY (NOOO)
Type of Activity: 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975
Food 43,674 43,198 48,490 25,156 51,226
Beverages 29,466 24,936 32,818 18,395 23,131
Tobacco 39,234 14,018 26,614 26,942 32,869
Textile 64,072 67,098 68,504 58,299 125,098
Footwear, wearing apparel, etc. 2,532 5,146 7,055 13,664 7,191
Wood and cork 1,214 1,586 2,026 576 1,397
Furniture and fixtures 8,320 13,502 14,715 5,962 14,832
Paper and paper products 17,250 10,542 16,440 1,841 9,590
Prmting and publishing 790 5,766 6,763 4,332 3,015
Leather products 2,056 2,502 2,667 4,107 3,318
Rubber products 13,438 16,142 20,084 7,802 7,554
Chemicals 27,718 28,312 36,084 34,326 30,258
Products of petroleum and coal 20,290 10,428 14,179 5,375 18,713
Non-metallic mineral products 44,486 34,882 38,764 23,114 51,191
Basic metal (iron, steel) 14,860 8,132 13,044 13,949 17,645
Metal products 10,374 14,662 10,629 11,716 18,520
Machinery (except electrical) 5,418 1,366 4,236 12,038 10,861
Electrical machinery 1,520 2,330 1,298 2,893 973
Transport equipment 11,614 35,780 22,661 5,469 23,234
Miscellaneous 19,656 17,278 20,385 13,089 23,504
Total; 377,982 357,606 407,156 289,045 474,120
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
Food 56,721 80,455 96,379 112,749 124,443
Beverages 83,134 44,397 71,357 83,771 92,661
Tobacco 15,371 32,172 79,031 79,287 79,287
Textile 139,333 131,045 349,091 353,081 349,259
Footwear, wearing apparel, etc. 19,284 23,896 13,942 17,418 18,076
Wood and cork 4,975 7,882 12,961 13,064 13,375
Furniture and fixtures 9,006 10,639 45,033 46,134 46,920
Paper and paper products 10,511 14,614 23,541 23,828 24,126
Printing and publishing 5,331 5,248 31,073 36,223 38,064
Leather products 4,003 6,253 9,598 11,279 12,717
Rubber products 6,394 8,107 61,717 68,023 68,757
Chemicals 31,581 113,780 128,016 139,599 157,393
Products of petroleum and coal 27,373 32,228 3,797 3,925 3,894
Non-metallic mineral products 62,721 69,832 103,494 108,892 113,047
Basic metal (iron, steel) 14,162 25,379 23,288 30,788 34,833
Metal products 17,770 28,278 65,004 82,061 102,726
Machinery (except electrical) 3,546 8,454 11,250 12,726 14,087
Electrical machinery 1,927 17,395 34,181 41,187 43,428
Transport equipment 32,629 71,490 7,059 35,468 71,653
Miscellaneous 34,488 53,969 108,078 114,710 122,943




1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
Food 149,136 169,183 203,723 175,441 221,726
Beverages 99,983 114,040 119,028 135,690 151,302
Tobacco 79,287 83,476 91,945 106,646 110,731
Textile 352,637 356,422 342,803 362,466 381,532
Footwear, wearing apparel, etc. 19,828 19,044 20,953 23,128 28,555
Wood and cork 13,477 18,150 14,138 14,768 2,561
Furniture and fixtures 47,536 48,167 50,004 49,764 23,381
Paper and paper products 25,745 30,098 32,423 33,726 34,976
Printing and publishing 39,999 42,853 43,098 43,920 54,609
Leather products 15,288 15,825 17,287 13,830 14,012
Rubber products 68,757 71,408 73,720 79,726 81,118
Chemicds 157,393 189,641 224,148 179,670 202,073
Products of petroleum and coal 3,946 6,647 8,240 2,795 2,795
Non-metallic mineral products 119,949 129,986 73,199 58,842 81,426
Basic metal (iron, steel) 39,121 46,421 57,771 66,259 65,979
Metal products 89,986 133,169 154,987 167,430 164,827
Machinery (except electrical) 19,502 20,062 41,230 26,758 45,720
Electrical machinery 45,049 53,177 62,716 50,497 46,548
Transport equipment 180,466 206,164 268,883 271,689 269,475
Miscellaneous 135,795 164,886 235,418 245,068 257,314
Total: 1,702,888 1,918,819 :2,135,715 2,108,113 2,240,660
Source: Central Bank of Nigeria, Economic and Financial Reviews (Lagos: Central Bank
of Nigeria, 1991), Table D5.5, pp.160-163.
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Sample Data Analysis
This part of the study describes the results of the survey questionnaires of
manufacturing activities in Nigeria. The questionnaire (Appendix) was developed to collect
the vital information important to this study. The limitations of the data were that a total of
30 questionnaires were administered in all of the regional sections of Nigeria, and a total of
26 usable responses (13 from MNC and 13 from IND) were analyzed (Chapters III and
IV). This is a small sample compared to the sizes and numbers of businesses operating in
the manufacturing sector of the country’s economy. Therefore, the results are not
necessarily representative for the overall situation. However, despite these limitations, they
are certainly illustrative of the existing trends and order of magnitude of this study.
Companies Covered
A survey sample of 30 companies, both MNC and IND, was selected using the
1990 Industrial Directory of Industries in Nigeria. Only companies which were primarily
engaged in manufacturing and employed ten or more persons were covered.
Manufacturing was defined for this study as the transformation of substances into new
products, and included assembly of component parts and processing of primary products.
Similarly, a company was defined as a factory or workshop which may have a producing
unit in one or more locations.
Industrial Classifications
The codes assigned to companies under this study conform to those listed in the
UN International Standard of Industrial Classification (ISIC) (Table 11). The locations and




ISIC Company Principal Products
Food Manufacturing:
3112 Milk products Milk, butter, yogurt
3115 Oils and fats Palm oil
3118 Sugar factories Sugar
Bgvgraggs;
3133 Malt liquors and malt Beer and stout
Textiles:
3122 Spinning, weaving, etc. Suiting, fabrics
Paper and Paper Products:
3419 Paper and cardboard Toilet rolls
Industrial Chemicals:
3511 Basic industrial chemicals Acid, raw acid
Other Chemical Products:
3522 Drugs and medicines Pharmaceutical
3523 Soap, detergents Soaps and cosmetics
3529 Chemical products Safety matches
3530 Petroleum refineries Lubricants
3559 Rubber products Sandals
Non-metal Mineral Products:
3610 Pottery Ceramics, clay pots
3692 Cement and lime Cement
Other Non-metal Mineral Products:
3699 Cement and lime Asbestos roofing sheets
Basic Metals:
3710 Iron and steel Iron rods
Fabricated Metal Products:
3819 Fabricated metal products Aluminum products
Transport Equipment:
3843 Motor vehicle assembly Vehicle assembly plant
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The following is the presentation of the locations and characteristics of the
responding sample companies covered for the study. Table 12 indicates the locations of the
MNC and IND. Major characteristics of the responding companies are also provided in
Table 13 for the MNC and IND.
TABLE 12





1 Benin 1 3522
2 Enugu 2 3699, 3843
3 Lagos 7 3523, 3212, 3133, 3522, 3118, 3522, 3112
4 Kaduna 1 3211
5 Port Harcourt 2 3115, 3559
Indigenous Companies
1 Aba 2 3419, 3212
2 Port Harcourt 1 3529
3 Ilorin 2 3523,3511
4 Lagos 1 3530
5 Nkalagu 1 3692
6 Onitsha 2 3133,3819
7 Bauchi 1 3692
8 Umuahia 2 3133, 3610
9 Warn 1 3710
ISIC = International Standard Industrial Classification of all economic activities.
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TABLE 13
CHARACTERISTICS OF SAMPLE DATA










1 3699 1963 229 112,000,000 51/49
2 3522 1987 41 3,600,000 60/40
3 3523 1923 2,106 1,783,000,000 40/60
4 3211 1970 1,452 290,000,000 40/60
5 3530 1962 637 95,270,284 37/63
6 3115 1974 126 200,000,000 51/49
7 3559 1984 340 59,997,530 40/60
8 3133 1962 3,277 2,155,000,000 40/60
9 3211 1963 9,890 1,514,830,000 59/41
10 3522 1963 298 175,000,000 60/40
11 3843 1981 729 882,000,000 40/60
12 3522 1960 188 41,753,000 40/60
13 3112 1973 461 662,280,000 40/60
Indigenous Companies:
1 3133 1976 870 170,625,000 0/100
2 3692 1958 1,649 141,160,000 0/100
3 3710 1982 5,237 319,737,000 0/100
4 3610 1963 450 15,000,000 0/100
5 3530 1976 616 788,306,000 0/100
6 3819 1983 126 3,000,000 0/100
7 3419 1978 250 55,000,000 0/100
8 3529 1987 91 25,000,000 0/100
9 3692 1975 1,589 755,288,000 10/90
10 3511 1989 280 75,000,000 0/100
11 3523 1985 318 300,000,000 0/100
12 3133 1963 685 192,364,000 10/90
13 3211 1962 1,474 145,250,000 0/100
ISIC = International Standard Industrial Classification of all economic activities.
N = Nairas
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Activity Type of Manufacturing
The vital need of foreign exchange is important to the Nigerian economy. Table
14(A) presents the frequency of export product by companies. The table shows that, of the
13 MNC surveyed, only four respondents stated that they exported their products; this gave
an average of 28.5 each for the four industries or an overall average of 8.78 percent of
products exported by each of the 13 MNC. Similarly, of the 13 IND surveyed, only five
responded that they did export their products, with an average of 4.5 percent each. When
this percentage is averaged among the entire 13 IND, only about 1.9 percent export their
products. One industry (ISIC 3155) among the MNC had a share of 80 percent of the
entire total average, while two indigenous industries (ISIC 3511 and 3523) had a share of
about 90 percent. Taken the other way around, the two industries in the sample survey
(MNC and indigenous firms) have a domestic market of about 90 percent each. This
supports the hypothesis for this Chapter, which stated that industries did not encourage
expon-related industries that could generate the much-needed hard currency.
Nature of Ownership
The acquisition of the economic ownership of these ventures in the manufacturing
sector determined who controlled the financial state of the company. Table 14(B) shows
the pattern of ownership of the industries surveyed. In the area of activity of the MNC,
Nigeria had an equity of 54 percent and the MNC 46 percent. Similarly, Nigeria had an
average percent ownership of 98.50 percent on all IND surveyed, while foreign interest
was only 1.5 percent. Table 14(C) shows the frequency distribution to the industrial
investment. It depicts that 76.9 percent of MNC industries were mainly in light consumer
equipment, with only about 23.1 percent in heavy industrial equipment. This was reversed
with IND, who showed a share of 53.8 percent and 46.2 percent in heavy equipment and
light consumer industries, respectively. This did not come
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TABLE 14
COMPANY DISTRIBUTIONS—FREQUENCIES AND PERCENTAGES
(MNC = 13, Indigenous =13)A.Frequency of Export Product by Company:
Export Company Average % Overall %
MNC 4 28.5 7.8
Indigenous 5 4.5 1.9
B. % Distribution of Ownership by Nationality:
No. MNC % Ownership No. Indigenous % Ownership
Nigeria 13 54 13 98.5
Foreign 13 46 2 1.5
C. Frequency Distribution of Product Type by Company:
No. Industrial % No. Industrial %
Durable Products Naadurabls PrpdUQtS
MNC 3 23.1 10 76.9
Indigenous 7 53.8 6 46.2
D. % Distribution of Raw Materials by Company:
Average %/Nigerian Average %/Foreign
MNC 51.3 48.7
Indigenous 72.2 27.7E.Frequency Distribution Regulation by Government Policy:
Government % Effect Government % Effect Government % Effect
Policy Taxes Policy Duty Policy Price
MNC 10 76.9 12 92.3 6 46.2
Indigenous 13 100.0 9 69.2 5 38.5
MNC = Multinational Corporations
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as a surprise, as IND must strive to meet their local needs by investing for their country's
growth.
Nature of Raw Material Procurement
While Nigeria may possess the attractiveness for raw materials and the drive for
capitalist investment, the technical, socioeconomic, and political problems of delivering
these resources may be considerable. Table 14(D) shows that multinationals obtained
about 51.3 percent and the indigenous firms 72.3 percent of raw materials primarily from
Nigeria. Similarly, multinationals obtained about 48.7 percent of their raw materials from
abroad, while Nigerian firms obtained about 27.76 percent—about half less than that of
MNC. Raw material dependency from abroad, as depicted more by the MNC in the above
table, places a huge drain on the Nigerian economy. The use of local raw materials by the
may accelerate the economic growth.
Nature of Government Policy Effect on Investment
Government policies and regulations cannot be isolated from sociopolitical
concerns. The tendency to generate revenue by the state government may drive away
investors if conditions are not flexible enough to accommodate their interest. Such issues
as taxes, customs duties, and price regulations are controversial to both foreign and
indigenous investors. Table 14(E) presents the frequency distribution of regulation by type
of government policy. Indigenous firms showed greater concern about taxes than the
MNC with about 100 percent, while MNC reacted differently on this issue with about 76.9
percent. As to customs duty regulations, MNC reacted with greater concern with about
92.3 over the indigenous firms, who showed a concern of 69.2 percent on customs
regulations. Similarly, MNC had about 46.2 percent price control concern compared with
the IND who had only 38.5 percent concern for such government policies.
86
In summary, the above figures indicate agreement with the hypothesis that
industries did not encourage export manufacturing products to stimulate the acquisition of
much-needed hard currency. This result was in line with the literature review (Chapter II)
on the nature of foreign investments in the manufacturing sector of the Nigerian economy.
The indigenization decree adopted by Nigeria about 12 years after independence provided
the Nigerian companies with the opportunity to participate and become a part owner in
these industrial ventures. There is no doubt that, as part owners, these industrial activities
within the country will contribute positively toward its economic growth.
CHAPTER IV
EMPLOYMENT EFFECTS IN THE MANUFACTURING
SECTOR OF THE NIGERIAN ECONOMY
The tendency toward NIDL is concretely manifested in the worldwide redistribution
of production sites for industrial production. This section of the study examined and
analyzed the employment effects of this development in the manufacturing sector of the
Nigerian economy by taking the sample data to test the following hypotheses:
1. The NIDL does not contribute to the solution of Nigeria's unemployment problem.
2. Higher wage rates offered by foreign companies to the local labor market has no
effect on the availability of quality labor to the IND.
3. Nigerian workers are not given the training and skills necessary to develop a self-
sustaining economic growth and the development the country needs.
The existence of numerous foreign establishments in the manufacturing sector in
Nigeria was shown in Chapter HI. The progress toward NIDL could easily be noted in the
changes in distribution of industrial labor and investment. The most important
socioeconomic aspects of the redistribution of production sites involved the use of
industrial labor indigenous to Nigeria. The establishment of those developments and their
impact on the country over a time period produced meaningful infomiation for this study,
and served to broaden the information base on NIDL.
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The Economic Upswing and Downswing of Nigeria
There was a continuous trend in the growth rate of Nigeria’s economy up to the end
of the 1970s. In the period 1965-80, the GDP grew at an average of 8 percent per year.
Most of this growth was related to a remarkable structural change in the economy at the end
of the 1967-70 civil war. Whereas the extractive sector (primarily petroleum) accounted for
1.2 percent of total GDP in 1959, by 1971 its share had risen to 15.1 percent. On the other
hand, agriculture—which accounted for 63.1 percent GDP in 1959—saw its share reduced
to 42 percent in 1971 (Table 15). The manufacturing sector, which grew at an average rate
of 13.2 percent from 1971 to 1980, provided additional evidence of this transformation of
the economy. Oil revenues rose from N172 millioni in 1969 to N507 million in 1970, an
increased of 194 percent in only one year.2 Since the 1970s, it accounted for 80 to 90
percent of total government revenue. The industrialization policy, which was purely an
import substitution—the NIDL—required the importation of large quantities of raw
materials for the rapidly growing industries, so that by 1981 the ratio of imports to GDP
stood at 25 percent.3 However, by then the situation had started to change. The decline of
the economy reflected a chronic dependence on the oil sector, which went through many
shocks in the 1980s. In the face of a worldwide oil surplus, Nigeria's output dropped
sharply from 2,092,331 barrels per day in January 1981 to 1,785,791 per day by
December of the same year, resulting in a 31.5 percent fall in oil revenues. This led to a
balance of payments deficit of N2,967 million.^
iWorld Bank, World Development Repon (Washington, DC: World Bank Press,
1988), p. 224.
2N = Nairas.
3P. A. Akatu and E. U. Olisadebe, "Management of the Nigerian Economy,"
Economic and Financial Review. 1987, p. 58.
^Central Bank of Nigeria, Annual Reports and Statements of Accounts (Lagos:




Indicator 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
Real GDP 5.3 (8.4) (3.2) (6.3) (5.2) (5.3) (2.1) 1.2
Real GDP/Capita (0.6) (6.3) (3.4) (11.0) (8.9) (8.1) (6.2) -
Inflation 9.0 20.8 7.7 23.2 39.6 5.5 5.4 10.2
Wages 100.0 94.0 101.5 74.9 42.3 41.8 - -
Exchange Rate 100.0 111.0 114.0 134.0 185.0 166.0 91.0 29.0
Debt as % of GDP 8.9 13.0 14.1 21.1 20.5 22.1 53.1 122.6
Reserves 5.8 2.0 1.2 1.0 1.7 2.0 1.9 -
Investment as %
of GDP
21.8 27.5 21.6 16.8 12.3 9.6 •
Source: Central Bank of Nigeria, Annual Reports and Statements of Accounts. Lagos:
Central Bank of Nigeria, 1991, pp. 92,117.
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The deficit led to outstanding debts. As a proportion of GDP, debts stood only at 2
percent in 1975, but by 1987 had risen to 122.6 percent. This increa.se in government
deficits mirrored the trend in general price levels. The inflation rate, correspondingly,
resulted in a decline in real wages during the 1980s and attested to the rapid decline in the
standard of living. Certainly, with the population growth at about 3 percent per year, the
country's per capita income fell throughout the 1980s. In response to this deep economic
crisis, the administration of Shehu Shagari was compelled to introduce a medium-term
stabilization program in April 1982. Then, in December 1983, General Buhari seized
power and introduced additional austerity measures. The Buhari administration was itself
ousted in a coup led by General Babangida in August 1985. In 1986, a Structural
Adjustment program was introduced with the support of the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund. It aimed at restructuring the economy with a view to
diversifying the production base and reducing dependence on the oil sector, achieving fiscal
balance-of-payments viability, laying the foundation for growth with minimal inflation, and
improving the efficiency of the public sector.5
With all these unhealthy economic aspects, it is good to reflect on the issue of the
Nigerian Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) and the NIDL.
NIDL and SAP in Nigeria
The SAP is designed mainly to promote the recovery of the Nigerian economy by
encouraging a culture of self-reliance in all areas of economic activities. Of particular
importance in the relationship of the SAP to this study is the area of resource utilization
within both internal and external activities, to increase domestic production in the areas of
5S. E. Omoruyi, "A Review of the Structural Adjustment Program: The Foreign
Exchange Market and Trade Policies in Nigeria," Economic and Financial Review. 1987,
pp. 29-33.
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food and industrial raw materials, to bring the mostly idle manufacturing sector back to full
capacity, and thereby to promote the inflow of investment capital. Thus, foreign exchange
is the underlying factor in the SAP initiatives, because the price combined with availability,
allocated to and used in the economy, are vital to bring the above efforts to fruition. The
taste of Nigerians and their preference for foreign rather than local goods is a further area of
concern for the SAP. Such drastic changes in external relations and indigenous lifestyles
have political as well as social implications. Nevertheless, the success of the SAP,
championed by Babangida's regime in 1986, rests fully upon external inputs such as the
World Bank's structural adjustment loans and the willingness of the major western banks
and other creditor agencies to reschedule Nigeria's loan obligations. Thus, any exchange
in external policies to save the deteriorating economic situation in Nigeria, without an
overall assessment of implications on the economy, would have disastrous consequences.
For example, the tendency toward the NIDL in Nigeria manifested itself after its
independence in the form of import substitution industries in the manufacturing sector.
These substitution industries, adopted by Nigeria after independence, were designed to
benefit both foreign and Nigerian investors in the manufacturing sector without taking
adequate measures to encourage local sourcing of industrial inputs.
In fact, the character of the Nigerian manufacturing sector creates obstacles to an
effective foreign policy such as the SAP of Babangida's administration. First, it is difficult
to change the pattern of foreign manufacturing investment in Nigeria from import
substitution industries to that of an export platform. Thus, a drastic reduction such as the
SAP proposes in the level of imported industrial input has implications on the availability of
the spare parts that keep the existing import substitution industries going, even though such
savings may help in making payments to reduce the deteriorating deficits. Such heavy
dependence of the industrial sector on foreign imports exposes the country to possible
blackmail by foreign suppliers of vital equipment, spare parts, and raw materials, and thus
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set the stage for the sabotaging of Nigeria's foreign policy initiatives (such as the SAP)
directed at such hostile powers. This is probably the most important reason for the relative
ineffectiveness of the sub-Saharan African countries' policies against apartheid in South
Africa. Similarly, the objective of the SAP, as it relates to manufacturing, necessarily
requires a reduction in the level of economic influence enjoyed at present by the MNC.
This also has the potential to create some diplomatic resistance from the home countries of
the MNC, who are also the major creditors of these international institutions.
The SAP was, therefore, designed for this sector of the economy in order to
restructure the productive base of the dependent industrial capitalists, in order to minimize
the dependence on imports of the industrial production process and maximize, instead, the
export of manufactured goods, while enhancing the utilization of domestic productive
forces. Such objectives of Nigerian policies cannot be realized with the external forces
listed above. For this reason, NIDL further intensified its efforts in the area of the
manufacturing industries by means of more capital-intensive, skill-intensive, and labor-
saving technologies, thus crippling the development of domestic industrial entrepreneurial
resources for which the SAP had been designed.^
Worsening economic conditions, and the introduction of stringent recovery
measures since 1982, seriously affected industrial activity. Production was severely
curtailed in the crucially important oil sector as well as in manufacturing, which was
heavily dependent on imports and had difficulty procuring raw materials, machinery, and
spare parts. From 1980 to 1984, total industrial production declined by 23 percent. This
decline was more pronounced and quite different from the 1970s, when the manufacturing
sector's average annual growth rate, based on the Central Bank index, was 15.6 percent
(Table 16).
6The Nigeria Institute of International Affairs. Structural Adjustment in Nieeria
(Lagos, Nigeria: The Nigeria Institute of International Affairs, 1990).
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TABLE 16
INDEX OF MANUFACTURING OUTPUT, 1970-81
(Base: Quarterly Average 1972 = 100)













Source: Central Bank of Nigeria, Annual Reports and Statements of Accounts. Lagos:
Central Bank of Nigeria, December 1991, p. 98.
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Review of Employment Effects in Manufacturing
Within the boom years of the 1970s, employment expanded significantly. Total
wage employment rose by 117 percent from N1.4 million in 1970 to N3 million in 1980.
Employment in the manufacturing sector increased by 74 percent.Unfortunately, during
the 1980s, the economic downturn due to the recession led to a reduction in employment as
opposed to the growth of the 1970s. Aggregate unemployment ranged from 10 to 15
percent. The statistics fail to give a completely accurate picture of the magnitude of the
unemployment problem in the various industrial sectors, but Table 17 shows the
deleterious changes in manufacturing over a one-year period. Estimates of employment
and paid-up capital in the manufacturing sector, based on the available data, are shown in
Table 18 for the period 1970-1983, except for the year 1979. The increase in employment
for the period 1970-78 suggests increased capital intensity, although it shows a decline in
the employment figure despite continuous increases in capital from 1980 to 1983.
Similarly, in Table 19, the data per industry for the years 1971, 1975, 1978, and 1980 are
grouped into five main categories; over the period when the food and clothing branches
remained dominant, their relative shares in value added and employment fell slightly. In
1980, food, beverages, and tobacco accounted for 28 percent of value added compared to
37 percent in 1971. Employment remained roughly constant at about 20 percent. The two
branches of (a) food, beverages, and tobacco, and (b) textiles, clothing, leather, and travel
goods, accounted for 40 percent employment in 1980. Their combined share of value
added in 1971 was 58 percent and of employment 51 percent. The heavier branches of
industry-industrial inputs and metal and engineering increased their combined share of
value added from 24 percent in 1971 to 38 percent in 1980. Their employment also
increased from 21 to 28 percent.
^Federal Ministry of Economic Development, Third National Development Plan




EMPLOYMENT IN THREE INDUSTRIAL
SECTORS BY OCCUPATION
Sector 1984 1985 % Change
Manufacturing 51,183 48,009 -6.2
Professional/Administration 3,865 3,916 +1.3
Clerical/Office 11,181 10,642 -4.2
Technical/Operatives 36,137 33,451 -4.8
Source; Central Bank of Nigeria, "A Review of Business Activity, January-June 1985,"
Economic and Financial Review (September 1985), pp. 37-41.
TABLE 18
COMPARISON OF ESTABLISHMENT, PAID-UP CAPITAL, AND












1970 703 224.8 127,100 181
1971 870 378.8 145,400 167
1972 1,052 356.6 167,500 159
1973 1,008 409.0 162,000 161
1974 1,045 520.4 175,300 168
1975 1,290 506.2 224,200 189
1976 1,310 550.7 274,200 210
1977 1,418 703.8 324,400 229
1978 1,075 1,263.4 305,500 284
1979*
1980 2,315 1,503.9 453,632 196
1981 2,342 1,705.7 449,093 177
1982 2,120 1,922.5 329,704 156
1983 2,112 2,128.1 322,396 152
*Not available.
Source: Federal Office of Statistics. Industrial Survey of Nigeria. Lagos, Nigeria:
Federal Office of Statistics, 1970 through 1983 (except for 1979).
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TABLE 19
STRUCTURE OF MANUFACTURING OUTPUT
Product Type 1971 1975 1978 1980
A. % Value Added at Current Prices:
1. Food, beverages, tobacco 37.2 27.7 28.7 27.6
2. Textile, clothing, leather, travel goods 20.8 20.0 16.4 9.8
3. Industrial inputs 17.3 15.6 15.5 12.8
4. Construction materials 3.2 3.5 5.1 3.3
5. Metal and engineering 6.8 13.8 14.5 25.0
6. Other 14.7 19.4 19.8 21.5
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
B. Total Employment:
1. Food, beverages, tobacco 19.9 23.3 20.8 19.8
2. Textile, clothing, leather, travel goods 30.6 27.4 30.7 21.1
3. Industrial inputs 10.2 10.8 11.8 14.7
4. Construction materials 3.9 5.3 5.1 4.3
5. Metal and engineering 10.5 11.3 12.7 13.4
6. Other 24.9 22.9 18.9 26.7
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Federal Office of Statistics. Industrial Survey of Nigeria. Lagos: Federal Office
of Statistics, various years.
Data Analysis
Employment Generation
High unemployment in Nigeria, as in other developing countries, contributed to the
demand for worldwide relocation of industries from the advanced capitalist world to the
developing countries. Thus, the creation of employment opportunities constituted a
cornerstone of Nigeria's economic policies. Both the Second and Third National
Development Plans (1970-74 and 1975-80) predicted employment generations of 3.3 and
2.25 million jobs, respectively, largely in the small-scale non-agricultural industries.8
However, well-designed programs can be killed by lack of capital and absence of
^Federal Ministry of Economic Development, Second National Development Plan
1970-74. op. cit., p. 325; and Third National Development Plan 1975-80. p. 373.
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the necessary infrastructure. There was no doubt that the employment opportunities created
by the NIDL through the MNC contributed to the reduction of this employment crisis and
also had economic as well as social impacts on the workers in general and the overall
Nigerian economy.
In order to reflect on the above contentions, the major characteristics of sample data
surveys on companies which responded (as discussed in Chapter III) were used for this
analysis. A total of 26 out of 30 companies surveyed responded; of these 26 companies,
13 were MNC and 13 were indigenous. The employment effect of the NIDL by the MNC
was related to their size as measured by sales, as shown in Table 20(A). The table shows
that the MNC sales were three times higher than those for indigenous firms, even though
the ratio of MNC employees to indigenous was 1.5:1. In other words, the average Naira
sale of MNC per employee was about N403,313 as compared to the indigenous sales
which averaged N195,345 per employee.
Similarly, the employment generation can be measured by its paid-up capital.
Research revealed that the IND employed an average of 47 workers for each N1 million of
paid-capital, whereas the MNC employed only 24 workers for the same amount.
However, the average equity capital of MNC per employee amounted to N41,498.9
compared to only N21,290.7 for the IND. Another interesting fact is that the average
number of MNC reaching N1 million in sales came to two, whereas for IND the figure was




Employees per N1 million in sales
Employees per N1 million paid-up capital







Thus, the overall picture, as shown above, shows that MNC tend to be far larger as
to employment. However, what type of employment generates the best support for the
Nigerian economy? The available data show that IND are more labor-intensive and thus
generate more employment than the MNC.
Another yardstick used to measure the employment effects of MNC in the
manufacturing sector was to compare them with those of the indigenous firms. Table
20(B) shows that, of the 13 MNC in the sample data, they employed a total of 19,774
workers giving an average of 1,521 employees per company. On the other hand, the IND
employed 13,635 in 13 companies, giving an average of 1,049. This was about one half
less than the MNC. Further, when the data were broken down into specific types of
industry in the manufacturing sector, the same situation prevailed. Table 21 shows a
continuous trend in employment generation by the MNC over the IND in the areas of
textiles, beverages, and chemical products. This suggested that MNC had a much larger
labor force, which contributed to solving the unemployment problem in Nigeria, contrary
to the first hypothesis of this chapter that they did not help contribute to the solution of
Nigeria's unemployment problem.
Employees in Management
A healthy economy is necessary for companies to achieve viability and profitability.
In turn, in a successful business environment, employees acquire management-
entrepreneurial skills necessary to develop self-sustaining economic growth and
development. In fact, the supply of management positions to build new firms and
companies for the exploitation of the Nigerian economy constituted the ultimate determining
factor of its economic growth. Therefore, it was of interest to this study to focus on the




A. Comparison of Employee Effect:
Sales (in million N)
Sales










B. Comparison of Average Employees/Company:
Total No. No. Companies Average No.
Employees ! Empl./Companv
MNC 19,774 13 1,521
Indigenous 13,635 13 1,049
C. % Distribution of Employment by Company:
Managers Skilled Qerical Unskilled
Nig. Non-Nig. Nig. Non-Nig. Nigerian
MNC 755 76 15,465 23 3,455
Indigenous 803 28 8,373 3 4,428
D. Number of University Graduates Employed by Company:











No. of Total Aver.
Empl Wages Wages
No. of Total Aver.
Emnl Wages Wages
No. of Total Aver.
Emnl Wages Wages
MNC 755 36,897 48,869





F. Frequency Wage Rate by Labor Competition (N=13):




G. Frequency Quality Labor by Labor Competition (N=13):
Labor Competition Quality Labor Percentage
Indigenous 4 30.8
H. Frequency of Workers Trained by Company:
Total Workers Workers % Trained
Employed Trained
MNC 19,774 10,944 55.3
Indigenous 13.635 7,989 58.6
I. Training Expenditure per Worker by Company:
Workers Trained Total Expenditure
bv Company Expenditure oer Worker
MNC 10,944 14,167,771 1,294.56
Indigenous 7,989 4,079,157 510.59




K. Comparison of Employee Training:
MNC IND
1. Percentage of Total Workers Trained 55.3 58.6
(a) Overseas training as % of total training 1.1 0.4
(b) Local training as % of total training 98.9 108.8*
2. Management Training as % of Total Training 18.2 37.7
(a) % of management training overseas of total workers 1.1 0.4
(b) % of management training locally of total workers 17.1 37.3
3. Blue Collar Training as % of Total Training 69.0 53.3
(a) % of blue collar training overseas of totd workers 0 0
(b) % of blue collar training locally of total workers 69.0 53.3
4. White Collar Training as % of Total Training 11.50 15.86
5. Training Expenses per Employee (N) 1,294.56 510.59
6. Training Expenses as % of Sdes 0.18 0.15
MNC = Multinational Corporations; N = Nairas.
*This figure is higher as it reflects the numerous workers who attended more than one
course during the year; i.e., each individual was counted twice.
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TABLE 21
COMPARISON OF TURNOVER AND EMPLOYMENT IN MNC AND IND










MNC Avg.: 3211 5,671 N902,415,000
IND 3211 1,474 N 145,250,000
Beverages:
IND 3133 870 N 170,625,000
IND 3133 685 N 192.364.000
IND Avg.: 3133 778 N181,494,500
MNC 3133 3,277 N2,155,000,000
Chemical Products:
MNC 3523 2,106 Nl,783,000,000
IND 3523 318 N300,000,000
N = Nigerian Naira
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As can be seen in Table 20(C), the smaller percentage of indigenous employees in
the managerial category were in the MNC. About 4 percent of MNC were in the
management positions, and 6 percent in Nigerian companies. The table also shows that
Nigerians had an overall greater share of the management positions in both MNC and IND,
with the ratio higher within the indigenous firms. It revealed that there was only one non-
Nigerian manager for every 16 managers in both the MNC and indigenous firms combined.
This development could be attributed partly to the government policy of indigenization
which was pursued since 1972.
The indigenization decree was reflected in the economic sector, as Nigerian
managers controlled the firm's management. Another interesting figure reflected in Table
20(C) was the greater number of unskilled labor in indigenous firms. While skilled
workers comprised 78.2 percent of MNC, leaving only 17.4 percent unskilled employed,
indigenous firms employed 61 percent skilled and 32.4 percent unskilled workers. This
showed that there was more concern on the part of IND to employ more Nigerians not
based on skills but for overall economic growth.
Similarly, Table 20(D) reflects the nature of university graduate employment in the
industry. The data revealed that, of the total workers employed by the IND, 6.64 percent
were graduates, whereas the MNC employed only 3.87 percent—almost twice less than the
IND. This disparity showed that the latter, despite limited capital, invested more in those
areas that would stimulate economic growth for Nigeria.
Wage Rates
The addition of "payroll" dollars" has been regarded as an important component of
the "push effect" of MNC in developing countries.^ Table 20(E) presents the wage effect
9F. Perry Wilson, "Multinationals' Value," New York Times. 1975. p. 33.
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on workers. It shows that MNC paid a total of N36.9 million to Nigerian managers, N7.4
million to non-Nigerian managers, and N 187.05 million to the other workers—giving an
average of N48,869, N96,771, and N9,917, respectively. On the other hand, the IND
paid N26.8 million to Nigerian managers, N1.8 million to non-Nigerian managers, and
N77.6 million to other workers; this gave an average of N33,313, N65,667, and N6,061
per worker. The data showed that MNC paid higher wages and salaries than the
indigenous firms, and non-Nigerian managers were paid almost twice as much as their
Nigerian counterparts. However, when the researcher questioned the effect of this wage
rate on the indigenous firms, only 46.2 percent of respondents said that wage rates had an
impact on their quality of recruitment, as shown in Table 20(F). Similarly, Table 20(G)
shows that 30.8 percent of IND stated that MNC had no effect on them as to labor
competition. This observation reflects a situation that is not uncommon in developing
countries. Labor power is cheap and can easily be recruited, thus accepting the second
hypothesis of this chapter: "Higher wage rates offered by foreign companies to the labor
market in Nigeria have no effect on availability of quality labor to the indigenous
companies."
Manpower Development and Training
One of the benefits claimed for MNC is the upgrading of the quality of the domestic
labor force. Such improvement comes partly through the acquisition of new skills through
informal on-the-job training and experience. More important, perhaps, is the skill
improvement programs companies offer through formal training courses. These are often
carried out domestically by the company's training department, other training institutions,
or abroad by the parent companies or other affiliates. Thus, one measure of the amount of
training offered to employees is the existence of a training department within the company.
Generally, such a department is obviously expected to exist within large companies.
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An incentive for attracting foreign and indigenous investors so as to promote
industrialization is the Industrial Training Fund (ITF), which was set up by the government
to coordinate and subsidize the industrial training activities in Nigeria. Its purpose was to
allow companies to invest time and money in training their employees. All employers of
labor in Nigerian industry are by law required to contribute 1 percent of their total payroll to
the ITF annually. The contributors to the fund may claim up to 60 percent refunds of their
training expenses every year. Table 20(H) presents the frequency of training of workers;.
Of a total of 19,774 workers employed by MNC, 10,944 or 55.3 percent were trained in
the year under review. Similarly, IND trained 58.6 percent of their 7,989 workers out of a
total employment of 13,635. This development was contrasted, however, by the training
expenditures per worker provided by each company, as shown in Table 20(1). Of the 13
MNC surveyed, N14.2 million was spent for 10,944 workers, giving an average of
Nl,294.56 per worker. Of the 13 IND surveyed, a total of N4.1 million was spent for a
total of 7,989 workers, giving an average of N510.59. This showed that the IND paid less
than half of their MNC counterparts. The data in Table 20(J) provided a different
revelation as to the training provided to workers: 84.61 percent of MNC had training
departments, and IND about 76.92 percent. This showed that, even though the MNC
spent almost twice as much, the IND had such provisions but might have lacked the capital
to spend on worker training.
Finally, Table 20(K) shows a detailed comparison of employee training. MNC
trained a higher percentage of their workers overseas with about 1.1 percent, whereas IND
had only 0.4 percent. This showed that IND trained more workers locally with about 108
percent, compared to MNC with 98.9 percent locally. This higher percentage, as depicted
by the IND, showed that many managers attended several courses during the year, where
each person was counted twice as an individual. When the figures were broken down
narrowly to management overseas and local, it was found that IND trained about 37.7
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percent of their management staff, compared to MNC who trained only 18.2 percent of
their workers in this category. However, the figure showed that only 0.4 percent of
indigenous employees went on overseas training, while MNC sent about 1.1 percent. In
the local training, the IND trained about 37.3 percent of their management workers, while
the MNC only trained 17.1 percent of their workers in the management category. Table
20(K) also shows a sharp difference for employees provided with training. In categories 3
and 4, MNC put more emphasis on training blue collar workers, whereas IND trained more
white collar workers. Thus, whereas the MNC trained about 69 percent of their blue collar
and 11.50 percent of their white collar workers, the IND trained 53.3 and 15.86 percent,
respectively.
The overall picture was shown in category 6. The training expenses as a percentage
of sales by each company show that MNC spent 0.18 percent of its almost N8 billion sales
for its workers during the year under review, and the IND 0.15 percent with total sales of
N3 billion, or two and a half times of sales volume less than the MNC. This seemed to
suggest that IND showed more concern for training than the MNC, although this was not
enough to refute the hypothesis that Nigerian workers were not given the training and skills
necessary to develop a self-sustaining economic growth and development for the country.
Furthermore, the higher MNC expenditures per employee training, as observed in the
analysis, cannot refute this hypothesis.
What was at stake here was the skills given to workers and the category of workers
who were given this training. While the MNC invested more in capital expenditures per
employee training, the indigenous firms trained larger numbers of workers given the same
sales volume. Therefore, the hypothesis was accepted.
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Testing of the Hypotheses
Three hypotheses were tested in this Chapter. The first hypothesis on employment
generation by the NIDL, "The NIDL does not contribute to the solution of Nigeria's
unemployment problem," was rejected, because the data analysis showed that the MNC
contributed more than the IND in employment generation. The second hypothesis, "Higher
wage rates offered by foreign companies to the labor market in Nigeria have no effect on
the availability of quality labor to the indigenous companies," was accepted. Certainly, the
abundant labor market minimized labor competition. Similarly, the third hypothesis,
"Nigerian workers are not given the training and skills necessary to develop a self-
sustaining economic growth and development that Nigeria needs," was accepted. There
was no aggressive effort by both MNC and IND to train their workers in the much-needed
skills areas. Surprisingly, almost all the management positions were occupied by
Nigerians, but they received almost half the salary given to their foreign counterparts. The
presence of Nigerians in such key decision-making positions is important for the country's




This chapter concludes the study on the impact of the NIDL on investment and
employment in the manufacturing sector of the Nigerian economy.
A total of 30 companies were surveyed for this study, with 26 usable responses—
13 from the MNC and 13 from the IND. The questionnaire (Appendix) was administered
to companies in all regions of Nigeria, and the data collected were analyzed. Evidently,
this was a small sampling of manufacturing companies, and the results are not necessarily
representative for the country as a whole. Despite this limitation, however, the data were
certainly illustrative of the existing trends. The researcher hopes that this study will
provide guidance to people doing further research work in this field. The study covered the
period from 1970 to 1985, and the following measures were employed to investigate the
problem:
1. Activity type of foreign industry in the manufacturing sector
2. Amount of job generation provided in the Nigerian economy
3. Wage and labor quality situations
4. Manpower training provided to Nigerian workers.
In order to obtain revealing answers to the above aspects of the problem, the




2. Kind of production activity
3. Year production first started
4. Form of ownership (Nigerian, non-Nigerian)
5. Sales and other receipts
6. Employee category and wage rates
7. Raw materials procurement
8. Manpower training provided
9. Labor quality recruitment
10. Government policy regulations
The Internationalization of Capital theory was used to explain the results of the
study as it related to the Nigerian situation, and the following hypotheses were formulated:
1. Industries do not encourage export manufacturing products that will stimulate
much-needed hard currency.
2. The NIDL does not contribute to the solution of Nigeria's unemployment problem.
3. Higher wage rates offered by foreign companies to the labor market in Nigeria have
no effect on the availability of quality labor to the indigenous companies.
4. Nigerian workers are not given the training and skills necessary to develop a self-
sustaining economic growth and the development needed for Nigeria.
The study was historical and descriptive in nature, and secondary as well as
primary sources of data were employed. Secondary sources were collected from the public
libraries, the Central Bank of Nigeria, and the Federal Office of Statistics in Lagos,
Nigeria. Although Central Bank of Nigeria and Federal Office data can be considered as
primary data, both publications often lagged by many years. Because of this weakness in
the availability of data, primary data were sought and collected through the questionnaire.
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Secondary data were used in Chapters I through IV, and primary data were used
specifically in Chapters IQ and IV.
In the literature review (Chapter II), it was pointed out that the NIDL was a
historical development in the capitahst mode of production as capital searched for new areas
for profit, new areas where labor was cheap and raw materials available for capitalist
advancement into which Nigeria was inevitably garnered. It was also shown that the New
World Economic Order was a mammoth undertaking in a decentralized global economy that
operated in an anarchic political setting. This setting lacked a central state to manage the
kind of processes of economic regulations implicit in the Third World call for a
development-oriented world economy. The frustrations and deadlocks in this undertaking
spearheaded the drive for the NIDL as the UN, under the aegis of the UNIDO, called on
the Third World to create the kind of atmosphere that would attract capitalist investment—
such as tax-free incentives, other government regulations, and export-free zones found in
many developing countries today. Chapter IQ described the presence of foreign investment
in the manufacturing sector of the Nigerian economy as an unmistakable pointer to the
tendency toward the NIDL, with political as well as economic implications. Both the
secondary and primary data were employed to analyze the impact of this venture on the
Nigerian economy.
The secondary data were used to investigate the types of industries located in
Nigeria during the years under study, and the primary data were used to test the hypothesis
that industries did not encourage export manufacturing products. Chapter IV analyzed the
employment effects in the manufacturing sector and employed the following measures:
amount of job generation, wage and labor quality situations, and manpower training.
Secondary data were used to show the trend of employment conditions during the year
under study and its implications within the economy, while the primary data were used to
test the following three hypotheses:
no1.The NIDL does not contribute to the solution of Nigeria's unemployment problem.
3. Higher wage rates offered by foreign companies to the labor market in Nigeria have
no effect on the availability of quality labor to the indigenous companies.
4. Nigerian workers are not given the training and skills necessary to develop a self-
sustaining economic growth and the development needed for Nigeria.
Findings
As a result of the above tests, the researcher presented the following findings:
1. The hypothesis that industries did not encourage export manufacturing products to
stimulate much-needed hard currency was accepted.
2. The hypothesis that the NIDL did not contribute to the solution of Nigeria's
unemployment problem was rejected.
3. The hypothesis that higher wage rates offered by foreign companies to the labor
market in Nigeria have no effect on the availability of quality labor to the indigenous
companies was accepted.
4. The hypothesis that Nigerian workers are not given the training and skills necessary
to develop a self-sustaining economic growth and the development needed for
Nigeria was accepted.
Discussion
The tendency leading toward the NIDL was manifested in the manufacturing sector
of the Nigerian economy as capital moved from advanced capitalist countries in the form of
industrial relocation (see Tables 8 through 13). As this tendency developed, the following
observations were made.
The import substitution industrialization pursued by Nigeria after its independence
was manifested as foreign investors relocated their industries to Nigeria. Chapter III
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highlighted the seriousness of this interaction and relationship, as most industrial ventures
were mainly tailored to serve local needs and consumption. Here, export earnings that
could have helped government revenues and stimulated the purchasing power of the local
currency (Naira) were lacking. Both the MNC and the IND found themselves competing
on the same market without any aggressive effort to put Nigerian products on the
competitive global world market.
In the area of job generation, it was found that the NIDL helped contribute to the
solution of Nigeria's unemployment problem, as indicated in Chapter IV. Thus, foreign
investment in the manufacturing sector was beneficial to the economy, as MNC contributed
more in employment than the IND. Again, the majority of management categories
comprised mainly Nigerians, as a result of the indigenization decree which monitored the
appointment of Nigerians to top-level management and board member positions. Also, the
MNC employed more management and skilled/technical workers than the IND. However,
the IND employed more unskilled workers.
An interesting observation was made in the area of wage/labor recruitment by the
IND, where the following hypothesis was accepted: "Higher wage rates offered by foreign
companies to the labor market in Nigeria have no effect on the availability of quality labor
to the indigenous companies."
The abundance of manpower and the soaring rate of unemployment that may tend to
negate this type of assumption was not confirmed. About 70 percent of IND claimed that
labor recruitment was no problem to them, despite the higher wages offered by their MNC
competitors.
The acceptance of the following hypothesis, 'Nigerian workers are not given the
training and skills necessary to develop a self-sustaining economic growth and the
development needed for Nigeria," resulted from the analysis of their relative inputs. Thus,
although the MNC spent more on training than the IND, the IND trained about 58.6 percent
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of total workers, while MNC trained only about 55.3 percent. Similarly, MNC only spent
about 0.18 percent of total sales of about N8 billion, while IND spent about 0.15 percent of
total sales of about N3 billion on training. There appeared to be no aggressive effort, on
the part of both types of companies, to train more white collar workers. Overseas training,
especially by IND, was lacking. Such a low performance could not accelerate
industrialization policies being pursued by the country.
Legislative regulations—such as the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree of
1972, amended in 1977 and renamed the Indigenization Decree—was the most promising
legislative law to fulfill the government's industrialization policy, which provided to some
degree the economic ownership and benefits of these industrial ventures to Nigerians.
Thus, the handing over of the management of these industries, in whole or in part, to
Nigerian managers and directors could be rated as an indication of some progress.
The nature of raw materials procurement was also highlighted in the study. None
of the companies showed an aggressive record for integrating local Nigerian resources into
the ongoing development in the world economy. MNC purchased about 49 percent of their
raw materials from abroad, compared to 28 percent for the IND in the year under review.
However, it seemed that MNC were using their industries in Nigeria to sell their home
country's raw materials, as shown by the data gathered in this study indicating that their
products were almost the same as those of the IND and were grouped in the same industrial
activity categories.
Another interesting observation was the effect of government policies on taxes,
customs, and prices on the two types of companies. It appeared that businesses, regardless
of type, reacted in the same manner, especially when it came to those subjects. The MNC
and the IND were not favorable to the government policies on taxes and customs duties,
but were less worried about price control regulations.
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Implications
The following implications were derived from the findings of this study:
1. The industrial ventures spearheaded by the NIDL did not encourage export product
industrialization which would earn foreign exchange for the Nigerian economy.
Attempts should be made for a gradual long-term process of positive interaction
with foreign investors. This peaceful transition would enable Nigeria to graduate
from its phase of import substitution industrialization to which the developing
countries of Southeast Asia such as Taiwan, Korea, and Singapore have already
graduated, and who are now major competitors within the global market.
2. Ownership characteristics in the study suggest that the Indigenization Decree
empowered Nigeria to be part of the industrial ventures being established in the
country. Such an aggressive policy may not pay a good dividend, especially in
those high-technology industrial policies which Nigeria is pursuing. No investor
would like his capital, which he knows is crucial to the economic development of
the country, to be dictated by a policy which will not guarantee him his best
economic interests.
3. The method of raw materials procurement within the manufacturing sector revealed
the MNC bought about half of their input abroad. Attempts must be made to correct
this imbalance by integrating local raw materials for production. This can be
diplomatically carried out by negotiating for extractive industries with vendors
and/or carrying out an extensive research plan to discover whether the available raw
material input could be obtained locally, rather than using money to serve another
country's economy.
4. The NIDL provides job opportunities, as revealed by the study. Such opportunities
can be promoted by tailoring the school curriculum, so that the school system can
provide available manpower to the industrialists who want to invest in Nigeria. The
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fact that there is a high rate of unemployment in Nigeria does not necessarily mean
that the right type of available manpower is available to attract foreign capital.
Cheap labor and manpower skills are motives that accelerate the drive for capitalist
investment. Today's high-technology industries and the country's industrialization
policy require government intervention in funding a school system that can produce
the right manpower and the infrastructure needed by the country's investors.
5. The labor quality and wage conditions data suggested that there was no recruitment
or harsh competition problem between the MNC and the IND. This may be true,
but the government can still protect and preserve workers' interests from hostile
foreign exploitation by creating a public service commission office to provide
investors with available manpower needs based on the salary scale.
6. The study also showed that Nigerian workers were not given the training needed to
fulfill the industrialization policy which Nigeria needs most. Here, the inadequacy
of this undertaking should be corrected by the government to negotiate seriously
with the investors on the means of subsidizing the cost on the part of the investors
in the form of flexible tax rate incentives. The long-term benefits of training
workers to be competitive and available to investors will foster an industrial take-off
and the economic policy of the country.
Recommendations
The above points should encourage Nigeria to integrate and benefit from the
ongoing NIDL. The following recommendations are based on a thorough analysis of the
outcome of this study:
1. Literature findings pointed out that Nigeria stands a better chance than most other
African countries south of the Sahara in the ongoing development of the world
market production in terms of raw materials, large market share, and manpower
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availability. Therefore, Nigeria could dominate most of the West-African region
with its goods and earn a good return, if policies are made to provide free trade and
pursue aggressive customs barriers. Regional economic cooperation must be
vigorously pursued. Joint ventures must be established with other West-African
countries to achieve an effective transportation and communications network as the
manufacturing sector of Nigeria expands. In an era of increasing regionalism, and
as the Economic Organisation of West African States (ECOWAS) becomes a
forceful actor of economic integration in West Africa, Nigeria can thus utilize its
ever-expanding manufacturing sector as an outlet for export and trade while
promoting friendly cooperation with ECOWAS members.
2. The success of any capitalist economic survival relies on the foresight of the
organization and its management's ability to recognize vital needs that will stimulate
growth. Thus, an infrastmcture conducive to capitalist development must be
available to attract the needed industries. An appropriate tax system can be
developed and revenue utilized for these infrastructures.
3. The school system, community leaders, teachers, curriculum developers, and
representatives of government must be encouraged to provide all the necessary
input to develop the best manpower for Nigeria's industrialization. Furthermore,
Nigeria must seriously negotiate with investors to support the areas of export







The transnational and multinational corporations represent an important sector of the
Nigerian economy. This survey is conducted as a PhD dissertation on the impact of the
New International Division of Labor on investment and employment in the manufacturing
sector of the Nigerian economy. I would appreciate it if you could assist by furnishing me
with the following information. YOU NEED NOT INDICATE YOUR NAME OR THE
COMPANY'S NAME.
Diank you ‘very much.
1. Where is the company located? City: State:
2. How long has the company operated in Nigeria?
3. Major products of the company:
4. Has the company established any other companies (apart from branches of this one)?
Yes No
5. If yes, how many such companies? (please state number)
6. Total amount of company paid-up capital:
7. Total sales of company:
(i) in 1992:
or
(ii) in most recent year available: (state year: \
8. Number of employees in the categories specified below:
(a) Management staff (total):
(i) Nigerians
(ii) Non-Nigerians




(d) Total number of employees:
9. Number of university graduates employed by the company:
(i) Nigerians
(ii) Non-Nigerians10.Is there a training department in this company? Yes No
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11. How many Nigerian employees were sponsored for the following company training
programs in 1992?
(a) Overseas management courses:
(b) Short-term management courses in Nigeria:
(c) Company-based technical training for blue-collar workers:
(d) Overseas technical training for blue-collar workers:
(e) Local training for white-collar workers:
(f) Others (please specify):
12. How much did your company spend on staff training in 19927:
13. Do government policies in any way affect your operation?
(i) Taxes Yes No
(ii) Duty/customs Yes No
(iii) Pride controls Yes No
14. Is your product an export product? Yes No
15. If yes, indicate the percentage of your company's overall exports:
16. Is the raw material from Nigeria?
(a) Percent from Nigeria:
(b) Percent from abroad:





18. Percentage of company ownership:
(i) Nigeria:
(ii) Foreign:
19. Do you think you pay higher wage rates due to labor competition with foreign
companies? Yes No
20. Do you find it difficult to recruit qualified labor due to wage rate competition with
foreign companies? Yes No
21. If you have any other comments, please use the remainder of this page.
T^haak you for your cooperation.
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